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Abstract
The three chapters of my dissertation examine immigrant assimilation in the Canadian
labour market. Through three levels of analysis, which are distinguished by the sample
restrictions that are employed, I investigate immigrant labour force and job dynamics,
immigrant propensity for self-employment, and immigrant wage assimilation, respectively.
In the first chapter, I exploit recently-introduced immigrant identifiers in the Canadian
Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the longitudinal dimension of these data to compare the
labor force and job dynamics of Canada’s native-born and immigrant populations. I am
particularly interested in the role of job, as opposed to worker, heterogeneity in driving
immigrant wage disparities and in how the paths into and out of jobs of varying quality
compares between immigrants and the native-born. The main finding is that the disparity
in immigrant job quality, which does not appear to diminish with years since arrival, reflects
a combination of relatively low transitions into high-wage jobs and high transitions out of
these jobs. The former result appears about equally due to difficulties obtaining high-wage
jobs directly out of unemployment and in using low-wage jobs as stepping-stones. I find
little or no evidence, however, that immigrant jobseekers face barriers to low-wage jobs.
We interpret these findings as emphasizing the empirical importance of the quintessential
immigrant anecdote of a low-quality “survival job” becoming a “dead-end job”.
The second chapter analyzes immigrant choice of self-employment versus paid employ-
ment. Using the Canadian Census public use microdata files from 1981 to 2006, I update
the Canadian literature on immigrant self-employment by examining changes in the like-
lihood of self-employment across arrival cohorts of immigrants and how self-employment
rates evolve in the years following migration to Canada. This study finds that new im-
migrants, who arrived between 1996 and 2005, turned to self-employment at a faster rate
than the earlier cohorts and that immigrants become increasingly likely to be self-employed
as they spend more time in Canada. More important, I examine immigrant earnings out-
comes relative to the native-born, instead of within, sectors and thus explore the extent to
which a comparative advantage in self-employment, captured by the difference in potential
earnings between the self- and paid-employment sectors, can explain the tremendous shift
toward self-employment in the immigrant population. The results show that the earn-
ings advantage between the self- and the paid-employment sectors accounts for the higher
likelihood of self-employment for traditional immigrants in the years following migration.
However, the potential earnings difference cannot explain the reason that non-traditional
immigrants are more likely to be self-employed as they consistently lose an earnings ad-
vantage in the self-employment sector relative to the paid-employment sector. My paper
suggests that immigrants may face barriers to accessing paid-employment, or immigrants
are attracted to self-employment by non-monetary benefits.
Lastly, in the third chapter, studies which estimate separate returns to foreign and
host-country sources of human capital have burgeoned in the immigration literature in
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recent years. In estimating separate returns, analysts are typically forced to make strong
assumptions about the timing and exogeneity of human capital investments. Using a
particularly rich longitudinal Canadian data source, I consider to what extent the findings
of the Canadian literature may be driven by biases arising from errors in measuring foreign
and host-country sources of human capital and the endogeneity of post-migration schooling
and work experience. The main finding is that the results of the current literature by and
large do not appear to be driven by the assumptions needed to estimate separate returns
using the standard data sources available.
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Introduction
The term “immigrant assimilation” refers to the process in which immigrants integrate into
a host country. Many theories have attempted to understand immigrant assimilation. The
classic assimilation theory hypothesizes that immigrants will show greater similarities with
native-born people in behaviors and characteristics over time, while the theory of ethnic
disadvantage holds that immigrant assimilation is blocked due to discrimination and in-
stitutional barriers. Researchers with different backgrounds attach importance to different
aspects of immigrant assimilation. Researchers in the economics literature have, for exam-
ple, examined spatial concentration (Warman 2007); language attainment (Chiswick and
Miller 2007); intermarriage (Meng and Gregory 2005); and measures of individual health
(McDonald and Kennedy 2004). Spatial concentration measures assimilation of a partic-
ular ethnic group based on their duration and concentration in a particular geographic
location. Language attainment tracks the increased ability to speak the host-country lan-
guage and the loss of the individual’s native tongue. Information on intermarriage between
people of different ethnic groups provides evidence of assimilation, particularly as high rates
of intermarriage restrict the intergenerational transmission of an ethnic culture. Finally,
studies of health compare various health measures between immigrants and similarly-aged
native-born individuals at the time of an immigrant’s arrival and as the immigrant spends
more time absorbed in the host-country culture.
The vast majority of the economics literature addresses immigrant labour market as-
similation, that is the extent to which immigrants come to share common labour market
behaviours and outcomes with their native counterparts. In particular, earnings and wages
are the most common measures of immigrant labour market assimilation. Economists of-
ten infer immigrant assimilation from their returns to an immigrant’s years since migration
(YSM) and hence predict whether immigrant wages/earnings might catch up with that of
native counterparts (e.g., Chiswick 1978; Borjas 1985). Based on the measures of wages
and earnings, the immigrant sample is typically restricted to paid employees or employed
workers with positive earnings. Nevertheless, the analysis by using a subset of the entire
immigrant population leads to a very common problem in the economics literature, which
is a sample selection bias as immigrants are unlikely to obtain employment or choose the
paid-employment sector on a random basis.
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The three chapters of my dissertation specifically examine immigrant assimilation in
the Canadian labour market. Three levels of analysis are used and they are distinguished
by the sample restrictions that are employed. The first chapter provides the broadest level
of analysis by investigating the labour market dynamics of the entire immigrant population
relative to the native-born individuals. Labour market dynamics are generally defined as
transition probabilities across states of employment, unemployment and the out of labour
force. It is argued that immigrants encounter barriers accessing employment and that this
is especially prevalent for recent immigrants. The first chapter explores the longitudinal
dimension of Labour Force Survey (LFS) data to compare the labor force dynamics of
Canada’s native-born and immigrant populations, and to examine the role of transitions
among certain states in driving immigrant wage disparities.
The second level of analysis narrows the sample to employed Canadian-born and im-
migrant workers, thereby excluding unemployed individuals and those out of labour force.
The second chapter is instead primarily concerned with the choice between working in
the self- or the paid-employment sector. Self-employment accounts for a highly dispropor-
tionate share of the labour market activity of new Canadian immigrants. Several papers
in the Canadian literature have suggested that self-employment rates have tended to in-
crease with the arrival of new immigrants and they tended to diverge from those of the
native-born when immigrants have been residing in Canada. Using a rich Canadian Cen-
sus data, I am able to examine any changes in the likelihood of self-employment across
arrival cohorts of immigrants, and how self-employment rates evolve in the years following
migration to Canada, especially for immigrants who arrived in Canada between 1996 and
2005. More important, I attempt to examine the extent to which a comparative advantage
(or productivity advantage) in self-employment, measured by the difference in potential
earnings between the self-employment and paid-employment sectors, can explain the shift
toward self-employment in the immigrant population.
The third chapter of my dissertation is the narrowest in scope, as it restricts the sample
to paid employees. At this narrow level, the focus is on assimilation in earnings conditional
on employment in the paid-employment sector. The third chapter attempts to estimate
separate wage returns to foreign and host-country sources of human capital as suggested
in the recent immigration literature. Using a particularly rich longitudinal Canadian data
source, I examine the extent to which the previous findings of Canadian immigrant wage
assimilation may be driven by biases arising from errors in measuring foreign and host-
country sources of human capital and the endogeneity of post-migration schooling and
work experience.
The study of immigrant labour market assimilation is very important in Canada because
20% of the entire Canadian population is comprised of individuals who were born outside
Canada. The results on immigrant labour market assimilation provide valuable insights
to inform immigrant selection and settlement policy. For example, the results of the first
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chapter reveal that immigrants have difficulties obtaining high-wage jobs directly out of
unemployment and in being able to successfully use low-wage jobs as stepping stones into
high-wage jobs. They suggest that immigrant settlement policies directed exclusively at the
unemployed will ultimately fall short in their attempt to facilitate the labour integration
of Canada’s newest immigrants.
In addition, research on immigrant self-employment may hold implications for revi-
sions to settlement policy. If the relatively higher immigrant likelihood of self-employment
is caused by comparative advantages (or productivity) in the self-employment sector or
non-monetary benefits provided by self-employment, policy makers may enhance govern-
ment schemes to encourage self-employment through guaranteed loans. In contrast, if the
results suggest that the immigrant propensity for self-employment is caused by barriers
to the paid-employment sector, policy makers will concentrate more on the employment
legislation and local authority assistance for promoting job opportunities. An example is
the foreign credential recognition program, which helps employers to evaluate foreign cre-
dentials. Similarly, a model for wage assimilation can predict which types of immigrants
experience rapid wage growth in relation to observable human capital such as educational
credentials and work experience. For example, the estimates in the third chapter suggest
that immigrants with more foreign work experience not only start at lower initial wages
compared with a similarly aged native-born worker, but also experience lower subsequent
wage growth. In contrast, we find little evidence that foreign schooling either lowers rel-
ative wage outcomes at entry or affects subsequent growth. Therefore, the conclusions
drawn from research on immigrant wage assimilation would have important implications
on both immigrant selection and settlement policies.
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Chapter 1
Immigrants and the Dynamics of
High-wage Jobs: Evidence from the
Canadian Labour Force Survey
1.1 Introduction
The deteriorating labor market performance of new immigrants to Canada, which occurred
between the early 1970s up to at least the mid-1990s, is now well documented in the lit-
erature (see Baker and Benjamin 1994 for early evidence and Aydemir and Skuterud 2005
for more recent evidence). Concerns over how best to reverse this trend have over the
past decade spawned a substantial literature informing the nature of the obstacles facing
Canada’s newest immigrants (see Picot and Sweetman 2005 for a review). Overwhelmingly,
these studies have sought to identify sources of variation in worker productivity between
immigrants and the Canadian-born with similar years of schooling and work experience.
Aydemir and Skuterud (2005) and Green and Worswick (2010), for example, identify dif-
ferential returns to foreign and host-country work experience; Sweetman (2004) examines
differences in school quality; Ferrer, Green and Riddell (2006) examine literacy skills; and
Ferrer and Riddell (2008) compare returns to education between immigrants and natives.
It is now widely recognized among economists that much of the wage dispersion observed
in real-world labor markets exists independently of heterogeneity in worker productivity.
Using matched employer-employee data, Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2002) report that
variation in how firms pay identical workers amounts to roughly 20% to 30% of overall
wage dispersion. An important question is to what extent these types of wage differen-
tials underlie the labor market challenges of Canadian immigrants. One possibility is that
employers discriminate against immigrants on the basis of something other than their pro-
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ductivity. The disparity in callback rates for Chinese and South-Asian minorities identified
in the recent audit study by Oreopoulos (2009) provides some evidence of this, though it
is difficult to know to what extent these differences in callback rates translate into wage
differentials (Heckman 1998). The possibility that employers systematically undervalue
equivalent foreign educational credentials (Bauder 2003) is also consistent with this type
of variation, though it is not obvious why such behaviour would persist in competitive
labor markets. A third possibility, which has come to dominate the theoretical economics
literature seeking to explain wage dispersion across employers, is that immigrant wage dis-
parities reflect heterogeneity in the productivity of firms, combined with frictions in the
information workers have about which firms are hiring and the wages they are offering
(Mortensen 2005). Suggestive of the role of firm heterogeneity in driving immigrant wage
disparities, Aydemir and Skuterud (2008) find that the concentration of recent immigrant
men from non-traditional source regions (Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe) in low-wage
firms within Canada’s major urban centres can account for roughly three-quarters of the
19% average wage gap facing this group.
The role of the job search process in driving immigrant wage disparities has received
remarkably little attention in the Canadian immigration literature. The reason for this
gap reflects, at least in part, the scarcity of longitudinal data identifying the transitions of
immigrants into and out of jobs of varying quality. A recent exception is Goel and Lang
(2009) who use data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC) to
study the initial job search durations of a representative sample of the 2002 immigrant
arrival cohort.1 An important shortcoming of these data, however, is that they contain no
observations on native-born workers. As a result, it is difficult to know to what extent their
findings reflect challenges common to all new labor market entrants. Further, they only
tell us about unemployed job search. But evidence suggests that job search while employed
produces higher job offer arrival rates (Blau and Robins 1990). This may be particularly
true for transitions into high-wage jobs and for immigrants who, in the absence of host-
country work experience, may lack the social networks needed to access high-wage jobs.
Or alternatively, perhaps low-wage jobs are stepping stones for natives, but for immigrants
they are “survival jobs” that become “dead-end jobs” as considerable anecdotal evidence
suggests.2 What is needed is a broader, more complete, picture that not only informs how
the paths into high-wage jobs may be very different for immigrants and natives, but also
to what extent immigrants may have greater difficulties retaining these jobs.
1Aydemir (2003) and Aydemir (2009) look at relative employment and labor force participation rates
using cross-sectional data. But these studies are unable to tell us anything about the process of acquiring
high-wage jobs and how that process might be different for immigrants.
2Canadian media reports of doctors and engineers being compelled to drive taxis in response to foreign
credential issues has become a cliché in popular discussions of Canadian immigration. See for example
“The crying shame of the taxi-driving surgeon, Toronto Star, March 2, 2009, pg. GT02; and “Credentials
and access,” The Globe and Mail, December 19, 2006, Pg.A22.
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Beginning in January 2006, the regular monthly Canadian Labour Force Survey (LFS)
began, for the first time, to identify the country of birth of all respondents, and for those
born abroad, the year in which permanent residency was obtained. Pooling LFS files be-
tween January 2006 and December 2008, we identify 375,289 (404,733) and 42,004 (48,924)
month-to-month observations on native-born and immigrant men (women) respectively,
satisfying our sample restriction criteria. In order to identify heterogeneity in job quality,
we begin by running a wage regression, using only the native-born sample, on a rich set of
observable worker and job characteristics, including union status; firm and establishment
size; and the interaction of a job-skill variable with four-digit industry codes. We then
distinguish high- and low-wage jobs in the entire sample by using the estimates from this
regression to determine whether an individual’s job characteristics imply job quality above
or below the median value in the native-born population. Predicted high-wage job rates
between immigrants and natives are then analysed assuming transitions are determined
by a stationary first-order Markov process between five discrete states: (i) high-wage jobs;
(ii) low-wage jobs; (iii) self-employment; (iv) unemployment; and (v) nonparticipation. To
our knowledge this paper is the first to take an exclusively dynamic approach to examining
the well-documented labor market challenges facing Canada’s immigrant population.
Our main finding is that the immigrant gap in the incidence of being employed in
a high-wage job, when compared to similarly aged and educated native-born workers, is
driven by a combination of lower transitions into and higher transitions out of high-wage
jobs. With respect to flows into high-wage jobs, we find immigrant disparities in both
transitions from unemployment and low-wage jobs, with the latter difference, but not the
former, tending to grow with an immigrant’s years since migration. We find little or no
evidence, however, that immigrant jobseekers have any greater difficulties obtaining low-
wage jobs. In fact for recently-arrived immigrant men, transition rates from unemployment
to low-wage jobs are if anything slightly higher than for natives. Lastly, our results suggest
that the moderate assimilation we see in the wage rates of Canadian immigrants, primarily
reflects productivity gains, such as improvements in language skills, rather than a process of
shopping for better jobs. Overall our results give an impression of immigrant job and labor
force dynamics that are remarkably consistent with the popular perception of immigrants
getting stuck in low-quality “survival jobs” that were intended to serve only as stepping
stones to better jobs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we discuss
the existing literature on search models of wage dispersion and their application to immi-
grant wage differentials. In Section 3 we present the data and our empirical strategies for
defining high-wage jobs and for relating the relative job transition behavior of immigrants
to their under-representation in high-wage jobs. The fourth section discusses the results
and Section 5 concludes.
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1.2 Existing Literature
The key mechanism underlying search models of wage dispersion is that job matches do not
occur instantaneously or costlessly because job seekers, whether employed or unemployed,
do not have full information about the jobs available. Mortensen (2005) argues that the
search theoretic approach to wage dispersion is at least as important as the alternatives,
including compensating differentials and efficiency wages, in driving wage dispersion across
equally productive workers. Although it is theoretically possible to generate an equilibrium
with a non-degenerate wage distribution in the absence of any worker or firm heterogene-
ity, whether on productivity dimensions or otherwise (Burdett and Judd 1983), it is well
known that such models do a poor job of replicating real-world wage distributions. More
important from our perspective, without any form of worker heterogeneity there is nothing
in the model to distinguish immigrants from natives and thereby explain immigrant wage
disparities.
To date, the main source of ex-ante worker heterogeneity to have received attention in
the immigrant job search literature lies in immigrants’ use of job search methods, and in
particular in their access to social networks. Goel and Lang (2009) present a theoretical
model in which the main effect of search networks is to raise the offer arrival rate, which
in turn leads to lower wage outcomes, but shorter unemployment durations, for those
who rely on these networks. Using Canadian longitudinal data on a single arrival cohort
(described above) combined with Census data, they find network strength is associated
with a higher probability of being employed six months after arrival, but also with a lower
wage, particularly for recent immigrants, corroborating their theoretical predictions. Using
a similar longitudinal data source from Australia, Mahuteau and Junankar (2008) also find
that the beneficial effect of networks is in reducing initial unemployment durations of new
arrivals, rather than in raising the quality (wages) of jobs obtained. Frijters, Shields and
Price (2005) compare the relative search methods of unemployed immigrants and natives,
and their relative effectiveness, exploiting the longitudinal dimension of the U.K. Quarterly
Labour Force Survey (QLFS). Their results indicate substantially lower job-finding rates
among immigrant men than among UK-born men, but find that the difference has virtually
nothing to do with immigrants’ choices of job search methods. Using an earnings frontier
empirical methodology and U.S. Census data, Daneshvary et al. (1992) find little gap at
entry in male immigrants’ utilization of job search information and complete assimilation
within 12 years of arrival.3
Unlike these papers, we do not exclusively consider unemployment durations, but rather
document relative immigrant transition rates between jobs and labor force states. In this
3We are also aware of three studies using a purely cross-sectional approach to examining the relative
unemployment risks of immigrants. Chiswick, Cohen and Zach (1997) use U.S. data; McDonald and
Worswick (1997) examine Canadian data; and Arai and Vilhelmsson (2004) examine Swedish data.
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regard, our paper is closest to the recent paper by Hansen and Loftstrom (2009), who
analyze the relative transition rates of Swedish immigrants into and out of social assistance,
unemployment, and employment, using the same dynamic multinomial logit model that
we employ, but are also able to control for endogenous initial conditions and unobserved
heterogeneity.4 Their results indicate a significant amount of state dependence in social
assistance use, particularly among refugees, pointing to the existence of a “welfare trap”
in Sweden. Given that Canadian policy concerns have been dominated by the relatively
poor wage outcomes of recent immigrants, as opposed to their welfare take-up rates, we
focus instead on identifying the relative immigrant transitions and paths into and out of
high-wage jobs.
Though the existing literature has almost exclusively focused on search methods, an-
other possible search theoretic mechanism for driving wage heterogeneity independently
of worker productivity are differences in reservation wages arising from heterogeneity in
non-labor income or preferences for leisure time (see Albrecht and Axell (1984) for the
baseline model with reservation wage heterogeneity). Immigrants, for example, may face
different costs of search due to wealth constraints, which forces them to accept low-wage
dead-end survival jobs. Or perhaps due to persistent cultural differences their preferences
for leisure are weaker or stronger. Though we do not attempt to identify any of these
alternative possibilities directly, the theoretical potential for immigrant wage disparities to
be independent of ex-ante worker productivity is an important consideration that we think
has not received enough attention in the immigration literature.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Data
The Canadian Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a monthly nationally-representative survey
of 53,500 households, involving nearly 100,000 individuals aged 15 years and over. The
LFS data have three distinctive features enabling our analysis. First, though the survey’s
raison d’être is to provide cross-sectional snapshots in time, in order to save on data col-
lection costs all respondents are (potentially) re-sampled for six consecutive months. By
matching individuals across consecutive months, one can obtain large samples of observa-
tions tracking respondents as they transition between jobs and labor force states and make
statistically meaningful comparisons of these transition between subgroups of the popula-
4Their administrative data tracks individuals over a 6-year period and contains essentially no sample
attrition. They are, therefore, better able to separately disentangle the unobserved heterogeneity deter-
mining initial conditions and subsequent labor market transitions than we are with at best only 6-month
panels.
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tion.5 Second, beginning in January 2006 the LFS began to identify the country of birth
of all respondents, and for those born abroad their year of immigration. This allows us to
distinguish between native-born individuals and immigrants, as well as to consider whether
immigrants’ job and labor force dynamics tend to assimilate to those of natives with time
since migration. Lastly, in the first month surveyed an hourly wage rate is identified for
all paid employees, as well as a rich set of job characteristic information, enabling us to
empirically distinguish jobs of high and low quality.
1.3.2 Identifying high- and low-wage jobs
We begin by pooling the January 2006 to December 2008 LFS files and extracting the
sample of individuals aged 25-54, in order to limit transitions involving school and retire-
ment. Using the provided labor force activity and class of worker codes we can straight-
forwardly distinguish four discrete states: (i) paid-employment; (ii) self-employment; (iii)
unemployment; and non-participation. But as discussed above, our primary objective is in
documenting relative immigrant transitions in and out of jobs of varying quality, as well
as the origin and destination states of these transitions. Using the wage data we therefore
also distinguish individuals in paid-employment by whether or not they are employed in a
relatively high- or low-wage job.
To distinguish high- and low-wage jobs we begin by estimating a log wage regression
conditioning on individual worker and job characteristics. Since wage rates are only identi-
fied for all paid employees in the first month in which respondents are surveyed, we restrict
the estimation to paid employees in the first month of their sample rotation so that there
are no repeated observations on individuals. In addition, in order to avoid complications
arising from differences in wage returns across immigrants and natives, due to lower school-
ing returns for example, we also exclude all immigrants. This leaves us with a sample size
of 179,597 employees. The specification we estimate is given by:
log(wi) = α + xiβ + ziθ + giλ+ γ1ti + γ2t
2
i + εi (1.1)
where wi is the real hourly wage rate (adjusted for inflation using a provincial CPI)
of worker i; xi is a vector of individual worker characteristics; zi is a vector of job
characteristics; gi is a set of geography characteristics; ti is a time trend taking on 36
(12 months × 3 years) possible values; and εi is an iid error term. Worker characteristics
include controls for age (and its square); highest level of educational attainment (8 cate-
gories); and married dummy. Job characteristics include controls for union membership;
5Matching is done using an individual identifier provided in the master files of the LFS. The identifier
amounts to a concatenation of dwelling, household and individual-within-household identifiers. Since the
LFS samples households, not individuals, false-positive matches are possible. We follow Madrian and
Lefgren (1999) in using sex and age characteristics to limit the number of false-positives.
9
temporary (as opposed to permanent) job contract; whether paid on an hourly basis (as
opposed to a salary); part-time (< 30) weekly hours; whether paid tips or commissions; an
interaction of firm and establishment size (10 categories); and most significantly the inter-
action of a job-skill variable (5 categories) with four-digit industry, for which we identify
1,447 non-empty combinations in the sample.6 Lastly, the geography controls include 10
province dummies (the territories are excluded from the LFS sampling frame) and a series
of dummies indicating the degree of urbanization of the area of residence (5 categories).
Since age and schooling returns are likely to vary substantially across gender, but the job
characteristic effects are intended to capture heterogeneity that is independent of worker
heterogeneity, all the variables in (1.1) except the job characteristic effects zi are interacted
with gender dummies. The results from this estimation are presented in Table A.1.
Having identified the 1,462-element job characteristic parameter vector θ in equation
(1.1), we then predict “job quality” at the individual level for all paid employees in our en-
tire sample using ziθ̂, that is for both natives and immigrants and the repeated observations
on individuals in which wage rates, but not job characteristics, are known to be measured
with error.7 Throughout the analysis we limit the immigrant sample to the foreign-born
whose age at immigration was 15 or higher. Since it is possible that the skill-industry cell
of observations not used in the estimation of (1.1) are empty in the estimating sample,
the skill-industry fixed effects are not identified for some observations and so we are forced
to drop them. Fortunately this affects less than 0.06% of the observations. A potentially
more serious limitation of our approach to measuring job quality is that the identified vari-
ation across job characteristics is confounded by unobserved worker heterogeneity. Our
view is that this would be a more significant problem if we were to estimate (1.1) including
immigrants in the sample. This is true because we know that job characteristics zi are
correlated with immigrant status and lower human capital returns β for immigrants imply
higher wage residuals εi. But when we restrict the estimation to native-born workers we
think the interpretation of the identified variation as heterogeneity in jobs, as opposed to
workers, is a reasonable approximation. Certainly there is a precedent in the literature
6The skill level of jobs variable is based on a concordance created by Human Resources and
Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) using the 4-digit National Occupational Classification (NOCS-
2006). The five categories are: (O) management occupations; (A) occupations usually requir-
ing a university education; (B) occupations usually requiring a college education or apprentice-
ship training; (C) occupations usually requiring secondary school and/or occupation-specific train-
ing; and (D) occupation requiring no formal schooling. The concordance table is available here:
http://www5.hrsdc.gc.ca/noc/English/NOC/2006/html/Matrix.html.
7Interestingly, when we also use the repeated observations on paid employees to estimate (1.1) we find
a clear pattern of monotonically increasing residual wages across subsequent sample rotations. That is the
coefficients on a set of dummies indicating the month of the respondent’s sample rotation are significant
and monotonically increasing from the second through the sixth month. This is consistent with within-job
wage growth, which the LFS fails to capture by only updating wages in re-interviews when job changes
have occurred.
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for interpreting industry wage differentials as “premiums” (Krueger and Summers 1988,
Kugler 2003). There is also good evidence that estimated returns to unionization largely
reflect rents (Kuhn 1998).
In Table 1.1 we compare mean values of wage rates and our measure of job quality
ziθ̂ between immigrants and natives, both unconditionally and conditional on personal
characteristics xi, geography gi, and the quadratic time trend ti (the unconditional rates
are shown in the bottom row). For both men and women, it appears that somewhere
between one-third and one-half of the disparity in immigrant wage rates can be accounted
for by their inferior job quality. For example, for immigrant men the conditional job
quality gap is about 0.14 log points, compared to an overall gap of 0.29 log points in wage
rates. This is consistent with the findings of Aydemir and Skuterud (2008), who find that
a significant portion of observed immigrant wage differentials can be attributed to the
concentration of immigrants among low-wage workplaces.
In Figure 1.1 we plot Kernel density estimates of our job quality measure separately for
immigrants and natives. Consistent with the larger unconditional disparity in job quality
for immigrant women in Table 1.1, the density function for native-born women, but not
native-born men, first-order stochastically dominates the immigrant function. That is
Pr(ziθ̂ > a|immigrant) > Pr(ziθ̂ > a|native) for all a. Consequently, for women, but not
men, it does not matter what threshold level of job quality we use to define high-wage jobs
– at all values the high-wage job rate of native-born women will exceed that of immigrant
women. Moreover, the lower we set the threshold, the larger the gap in rates will be. For
men, on the other hand, if the threshold is set sufficiently high, the high-wage job rate of
immigrants will exceed that of natives (at least unconditionally).
In choosing a threshold we assume that what matters to immigrants is whether the
quality of their job, implied by their job characteristics, is better than the median value
in the population of native-born workers of the same gender. We, therefore, define the
high-wage job state as 1(ziθ̂ ≥ median(ziθ̂|genderi)), where 1 is an indicator function. Paid
employees not in a high-wage job are defined as being in a low-wage job. The median values
used are illustrated in Figure 1.1 by the dashed vertical lines. They reveal disparities in
high-wage job rates for both immigrant men and women, though the difference is larger for
women, reflecting in particular the over-representation of immigrant men in exceptionally
high quality jobs apparent in the upper tail of the male distribution (top panel of Figure
1.1).
In Figure 1.1, the solid vertical line gives an example of the job quality of immigrant
taxi drivers in order to illustrate how we derive the job quality and define high- or low-wage
jobs. When we estimate the job quality, we do not use the immigrants’ wages since the
log wage regression limits to only Canadian-born paid employees. With the returns of job
characteristics obtained from Canadian-born workers conditional on age, marital status,
education and geography, we estimate that the job quality of immigrant taxi drivers is
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-0.429, which is completely implied by its job characteristics, as opposed to workers. In
addition, the predicted job quality is below the medians in the native-born population so
that taxi driver is classified as low-wage jobs in immigrant population.
In order to get some sense of what types of jobs may be driving the differences in
Figure 1.1, in Table 1.2 we identify the skill-industry cells of the five most common high-
and low-wage jobs separately for immigrants and natives. We think there are two partic-
ularly noteworthy results. First, for immigrant men the five most common high-wage jobs
account for 9.3% of all immigrant jobs compared to 8.2% for native-born men. Moreover,
the most common immigrant jobs – the top two of which are jobs requiring a university de-
gree in computer systems design (NAICS 5415) and architectural and engineering services
(NAICS 5413) – tend to be of higher quality than the most common native-born high-wage
jobs – university-educated school teachers and non-university educated building equipment
contractors and city workers. This difference becomes even more salient when we consider
the 10 most common jobs (for the sake of brevity we only report the top five). The pattern,
however, looks quite different for women. Here the most common high-wage jobs, for both
natives and immigrants, are more likely to be in the public sector, but the top five account
for a much lower proportion of immigrant than native jobs (top five account for 14.8% of
all native jobs, but only 7.9% of immigrant jobs). Clearly this concentration of immigrant
men, but not women, in high-wage jobs plays an important role in moderating the wage
disparities of immigrant men, but not women.
The second striking feature of Table 1.2 is the relative concentration of immigrant
men and women in a small number of low-wage jobs. For immigrant men, the five most
common low-wage jobs – restaurant cooks, truckers, unskilled factory workers, and security
guards – account for 6.8% of all immigrant jobs, compared to 4.5% for natives. Similarly,
for immigrant women, the five most common low-wage jobs – unskilled jobs in nursing
homes, daycares, banks, fast-food restaurants, and cleaning staff in building and dwellings
– account for 10.1% of all jobs, compared to 7.5% for native women.
1.3.3 Dynamic model
Our empirical methodology for analysing wage dynamics closely follows the approach of
Kuhn and Schuetze (2001) in their analysis of secular trends in Canadian self-employment
rates. We begin by assuming that the dynamics of immigrants and natives between five
job and labor market states – high-wage jobs (H); low-wage jobs (L); self-employment
(S); unemployment (U); and nonparticipation (N) – can be approximated by a first-order
Markov process. That is, the probability of being in any particular state in month t + 1
(the destination state), which we call j, depends only on the state of the individual in
month t (the origin state), which we write k. The entire stochastic system can therefore
be described in a single 5x5 transition matrix P with elements pjk. Moreover, the elements
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can be estimated unconditionally or by five separate multinomial logit (MNL) models,
which in each case restrict the sample to individuals who are observed in the origin state
j in month t and predict the probabilities of being in each of the five destination states k
in period t+ 1, conditional on set of period t observable characteristics.
Since we ultimately want to compare the transitions of natives and immigrants and
the difference in rates of being employed in a high-wage job, in all cases we include an
immigrate dummy to allow for “unexplained” immigrant deviations in pjk conditional on
observables. Then, we evaluate the statistical significance of pjk between immigrants and
natives by using the standard errors of the marginal effect of immigrant dummy. The
marginal effect is the discrete change of pjk as the immigrant dummy variable changes
from 0 to 1 and the standard error of marginal effect is estimated by taking a first-order
Taylor-series expansion around the true values of parameters.8 Moreover, we assume that
the stochastic Markov process, given by P, is in a steady-state. That is, the proportion of
workers in each state in any given month is time invariant. Since the recent U.S. financial
crisis did not begin to spill over to the Canadian labor market in a significant way until
2009, this assumption appears reasonable over the 2006-2008 period our data cover.9 We
therefore assume that the Markov process P has an ergodic (or stationary) distribution q,
which is given by the eigenvector of P associated with the unit eigenvalue, that is:
Pq = q. (1.2)
The restriction that the elements q sum to one insures a unique solution. Judd (1998)
shows that a direct way to solve for q is obtained by expressing equation (1.2) as the linear
system (P− 1)q = 0, which after imposing
∑
qi = 1 amounts to:
q =






p41 · · · p44 − 1 1








Defining the first state as a high-wage job, the first element of the vector q then tells us the
proportion of the population in a high-wage job. Since we are primarily interested in rela-
tive immigrant access to good jobs, as opposed to differences in labor market attachment,
we define the high-wage job rate as the proportion of the labor force
∑
(H + L + S + U)
in a high-wage job.
8The command of “margeff” in Stata software analytically estimates average marginal effects and their
standard errors using the delta method.(See “Estimation of marginal effects using margeff” in the Stata
Journal (2005) 5, Number 3, pp.309-329 for details.)
9We have tried estimating all of our transition matrices dropping the data before August 2008 and the
results are very similar. We would be surprised, however, if this were the case with the 2009, to which we
did not have access when writing this paper.
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In judging their own labor market performance, we believe that what matters to im-
migrants is how their access to high-wage jobs compares to similarly aged and educated
native-born workers in their geographic vicinity. Our starting point is therefore to com-
pare the transition matrices P of immigrants and natives conditional on the vector of
individual characteristics xi and geography gi in equation (1.1). In order to gain insight
into the nature of the immigrant disparities in access to high-wage jobs, we then produce
two types of counterfactual immigrant high-wage job rates. First, to identify the relative
importance of the individual elements of the transition matrix P, we compute counterfac-
tual high-wage job rates by replacing particular elements of the immigrant matrices with
their corresponding native-born values.10 The question of interest is to what extent the
counterfactual immigrant high-wage rates approach the high-wage rates of natives and in
particular, which transitions go the furthest in reducing the immigrant gaps.
Second, we add a set of covariates that, unlike the elements of xi and gi, are specific
to an origin state. Hence, for individuals in either a high- or low-wage job in period t
the MNL model that predicts their destination state includes (in addition to xi, gi and an
immigrant dummy) the same union, temporary job, hourly-paid, and firm/establishment
size variables used in (1.1), as well as controls for industry (21 categories); occupation (25
categories); voluntary/involuntary part-time work; and months of job tenure (quadratic).
For individuals who are self-employed in period t, the MNL model adds controls for indus-
try, occupation, voluntary/involuntary part-time, and job tenure. For the unemployed, the
model adds indicators for search methods used (7 possible methods); the number of meth-
ods used; indicators of whether the individual has a future job start or is on a temporary
layoff; and the duration of unemployment (quadratic). Lastly non-participants, we condi-
tion on an indicator of whether the individual has ever worked; whether the individual is a
discouraged worker; and the duration of joblessness (quadratic). The question of interest
to us is to what extent this richer set of covariates can account for the unexplained gaps we
observe in immigrant high-wage job rates when we only condition on age, education and
geography. We are particularly interested in the effect of adding tenure, unemployment,
and nonparticipation durations since it is likely that hazard rates out of all five states are
duration dependent, and in the case of job tenure in particular, we know that immigrants’
limited time in Canada necessarily implies lower average job tenure.
10Since the columns of P must sum to one, changing any particular element requires adjusting the
remaining four. In doing so we follow Kuhn and Schuetze (2001) and adjust the remaining four transition
probabilities so as to maintain their relative proportions. For example, if the elements of a particular
column are [0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2] and we replace the first element with 0.5, all the remaining elements
become 0.125.
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1.3.4 Limitations of the LFS
Two potentially serious limitations of the LFS data in studying labor market or job dy-
namics are (i) non-random sample attrition; and (ii) reporting error due to high reliance
on household proxy responses (on average 55% of all responses). Similar to the Current
Population Survey (CPS) monthly sample attrition rates are typically about 3% in our
sample and tend to decrease slightly between months two and six. Of greater concern is
that the rates tend to be slightly higher for immigrants. So, for example, the attrition
rate between the first and the second month of the rotation is 5.5% for immigrant men
compared to 3.4% for native-born men. An important part of this difference, perhaps all of
it, likely reflects more international migration among immigrants, which any longitudinal
data source will fail to capture (and we probably do not want to capture). To gauge the
potential effects of attrition, we began by using the approach of Manski (1989) to put
nonparametric bounds on the transition rates in P. In most cases, though not all, the
attrition rates are high enough that the native and immigrant bounds overlap nullifying
unambiguous rankings.
The effect of proxy response on reporting errors in the Canadian LFS data, and similar
surveys in many other countries, is known, though arguably not well recognized by analysts
using these data (a notable exception is Poterba and Summers 1995). Lemaitre (1988)
examines data from a quality assurance program of the Canadian LFS, which reinterviews
approximately 2% of the original sample in the week following the survey week. These
data offer two key insights. First, inconsistent reporting between the original interview
and reinterview is only slightly higher for multicategorical variables than binary variables,
but significantly higher for quasicontinuous variables, such as hours of work. This provides
further support for our approach of focusing on transitions in job characteristics, as opposed
to changes in wage rates. Second, inconsistencies are substantially higher when only one
response is nonproxy than when either both responses are nonproxy or both are by the same
proxy respondent (typically the spouse). As further evidence of this, we find implausibly
large transition rates between high- and low-wage jobs (typically twice as high), when all
transitions are used than when we limit the sample to observations in which the respondent
in months t and t+ 1 are the same person, whether proxy or nonproxy. To limit this bias,
we therefore exclude all observations in which the household respondent in month t and
t + 1 is not the same individual, which also has the effect of removing all attrition in the
sample, since in these cases there is no respondent in t+ 1.
The important question is whether this restriction, which excludes 42% (40%) of the
original male (female) sample, compromises the external validity of our results. In other
words, are job and labor market dynamics substantively different in the attrition sample or
where the household survey respondent changes across months. Unfortunately, there is no
straightforward way to know this since the destination states of dropped observations are
either unobserved or not trusted. Table 2 of the Appendix A (Table A.2) reports means in
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observable characteristics (in period t) across three disjoint samples: (i) observations with
a common respondent in period t and t+ 1; (ii) observations with a different respondent in
period t and t+ 1; and (iii) observations that attrite in period t+ 1. Stars in the “different
respondent” and “attrition” samples indicate whether the means are statistically different
than in the “same respondent” sample. In almost all cases the attrition sample appears to
be the outlier. They are younger, lower paid, less educated, more urban, and more likely
to be foreign born. The differences between the two matched samples, however, appear
quite modest (though usually statistically significant reflecting the large samples). The
most salient difference is that individuals in our “same respondent” sample are less likely
to be married, presumably reflecting the fact that the likelihood of a different adult respon-
dent answering the telephone goes up as the number of adults in the household increases.
Otherwise, the samples look similar. Though informative, similarity on observables does
not, however, rule out important unobservable differences. One could imagine that fac-
tors driving attrition, or geographic mobility more specifically, are particularly likely to be
latent in nature.
In order to gauge to what extent the high-wage job rates based on the transitions of
our preferred “same-respondent” sample may be unrepresentative, we need a benchmark.
Taking the pooled sample of all individuals in the first month of their sample rotation, we
can estimate a cross-sectional high-wage job rate that is not only nationally-representative
and free of any attrition bias, but also, to our knowledge, not biased in any particular
direction as a result of systematic proxy reporting error. We can therefore compare our
high-wage job rates based exclusively on the transition data (and the ergodic distributional
assumption) to the cross-sectional rates to determine whether or not our approach pro-
duces reasonably representative estimates of high-wage job rates in the population. Since
the cross-sectional estimates are restricted to first interviews, whereas the dynamic esti-
mates are based entirely on transitions, they are based on entirely independent sources of
data. Besides sampling error, which should be minimal given our sample sizes, and the
validity of the steady-state assumption, any differences in these estimates should reflect
the consequences of sample attrition and spurious job transitions arising from reporting
errors.
The results from this comparison, reported in Table 1.3, reveal remarkably similar
high-wage job rates, as well as low-wage job, unemployment, self-employment, and non-
participation rates, using the cross-sectional and longitudinal data. This suggests not only
that the stationarity assumption is a reasonable approximation over our sample period,
but also that attrition and our “same-respondent” sample restriction do not tend to bias
the estimates in any particular direction. Although the differences between the rates are
somewhat larger for immigrant men, which we might expect given the higher rates of sam-
ple attrition in this group, they are still modest (in all cases less than 3 percentage points).
We, therefore, think that our approach of using these ergodic rates, and their underlying
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job and labor market transitions, to shed some light on the the nature of the challenges
Canadian immigrants face in accessing high-wage jobs is worthwhile.
1.4 Results
As described above, we begin by comparing predicted monthly transition rates between
immigrants and natives from five MNL models holding characteristics (age, education,
marital status, and geography) constant at the native-born mean values, but setting the
immigrant dummy equal to 0 for natives and 1 for immigrants. These rates are presented in
Table 1.4 in 5x5 matrices separately for men and women. The most striking differences are
in transitions into high-wage jobs directly from unemployment. For men, the native rate
is twice the magnitude of the immigrant rate (5.3% compared to 2.6%), while for women
it is four times as large (4.6% compared to only 1.0% for immigrant women). Assuming
a first-order Markov process, the hazard rate out of unemployment is necessarily constant
and expected unemployment durations are simply 1/(1− [Ut, Ut+1]), where [Ut, Ut+1] is the
likelihood of remaining in the unemployed state. Despite difficulties accessing high-wage
jobs directly from unemployment, the estimates imply only slightly higher (and statistically
insignificant) average unemployment durations for immigrant men – 2.92 months compared
to 2.73 for natives – and virtually identical durations for women – 2.54 compared to 2.53
months. The reason is not only that immigrant jobseekers are much more likely to leave the
labor force in any given month (this appears particularly true for women where more than
one-fifth of jobseekers are expected to be nonparticipants in the following month compared
to one-in-seven native-born jobseekers), but also that they appear to have no comparable
difficulties accessing low-wage jobs. In fact, among men the immigrant-native difference in
transition rates from unemployment to low-wage jobs is statistically insignificant.
Having obtained a low-wage job, is there any evidence that immigrants are better able
to use these jobs as stepping stones to high-wage jobs? The estimates in Table 1.4 suggest
not. Among both men and women, the low- to high-wage job transition rate is significantly
lower for immigrants than natives. Among men the rate is 1.4% for natives compared to
1.1% for immigrants, while among women it is 1.2% compared to 0.8%. Although the
magnitude of these differences appear small (relative to the unemployment transitions),
they are based on substantially larger stocks, so that they imply large differences in levels
of worker flows. An important question is to what extent the lower immigrant low- to
high-wage transition rates reflect a disparity in job search effectiveness, in job offer arrival
rates for example, as opposed to lower job search activity. Unfortunately, in the absence
of information on the search activities of employed workers in the LFS data, we are unable
to provide direct evidence on this. A possible explanation on immigrant lower transition
rate from low- to high-wage jobs is that immigrants and natives may be in very different
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low-wage jobs. For example, relatively low skilled immigrants may end up in jobs with
prospect of promotion or advancement due to poor language skills or the lack of links to
the larger job market. However, the results in Table 1.2 show that the low-wage jobs are
very similar between immigrants and natives. In particular, both immigrant and native
women tend to work in unskilled jobs in nurses, banks and daycare. Moreover, given what
we know about immigrant job dissatisfaction, in particular about greater skill mismatch
in immigrants’ jobs (Galarneau and Morissette 2004), it seems more likely to us it reflects
search effectiveness. Our finding, therefore, appears to provide some empirical support for
the popular perception of immigrants getting stuck in low-quality “survival” jobs.
Differences in the flows out of high-wage jobs between immigrants and natives appear
similarly small in magnitude, but again are based on much larger stocks. The higher
outflows for immigrants suggest significantly shorter immigrant durations in high-wage
jobs. For men, this appears driven by a combination of higher transitions into both low-
wage jobs, self-employment and unemployment, whereas for women there is also evidence
of greater transitions into nonparticipation. Unfortunately, the LFS data tell us nothings
about the nature of the transitions into low-wage jobs and self-employment, since reasons
for job separations are only identified in subsequent months when the destination state is
unemployment. Regardless, the results in Table 1.4 suggest that the under-representation
of immigrants in high-wage jobs reflects not only difficulties in obtaining these jobs, but
also differences in retention.
Below the transition matrices in Table 1.4 we compute the high-wage job rates im-
plied by these transitions and the ergodic distributional assumption in equation (1.2). In
comparison to the unconditional rates in Table 1.3, the immigrant-native gaps when we
condition on age, education, marital status and geography are substantially larger. For
men the gap in the incidence of being employed in a high-wage job increases from 4.2
(0.374-0.332) to 16.3 (0.380-0.217) percentage points when we assign immigrants native
characteristics. For women the increase is even larger – 22.3 (0.401-0.178) compared to
10.3 (0.380-0.217) percentage points. In what follows we examine which individual transi-
tion rates pjk are driving these large gaps and whether a richer set of covariates can explain
them away.
In Table 1.5, we present counterfactual immigrant high-wage job rates obtained by
replacing individual elements of the immigrant transition matrices with the corresponding
values from the native-born matrices. In parentheses we indicate what percentage of the
conditional gap is closed as a result (negative values in parentheses imply that the gap
widens). In addition, we report the counterfactual rates when all the entry or exit flow
elements are replaced. For example, the high-wage job rates reported in the row “Entry to:
high wage job” are obtained by replacing all the off-diagonal elements of the first row of
the immigrant transition matrices, whereas the rates labeled “Exit from: high-wage job”
are obtained by replacing all the off-diagonal elements in the first column of the immigrant
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transition matrix.11
The main result from Table 1.5 is that the under-representation of immigrants in high-
wage jobs reflects a combination of relatively low flows into high-wage jobs and high flows
out of these jobs. For women, the challenge appears to have more to do with accessing
high-wage jobs, particularly from low-wage jobs and unemployment. Together these two
transitions can account for nearly half of the overall gap in high-wage jobs for immigrant
women (23.8%+20.4%). For men transitions out of high-wage jobs, particularly into low-
wage jobs and self-employment, play a larger role. In fact, two-thirds (68.5%) of the gap for
immigrant men is closed when we assign them the high-wage job exit rates of native-born
men. We think that this result probably does more to challenge conventional wisdom than
the finding of low flows into high-wage jobs. Unfortunately, as noted above, the data do
not allow us to say much about the nature of the transitions out of high-wage jobs. The
exceptionally high transitions from high-wage jobs to self-employment for immigrant men
are, however, consistent with cross-sectional analyses of Canadian Census data identifying
a tendency for immigrant self-employment rates to diverge relative to natives with years
since migration (Frenette 2004; Schuetze 2010).
Lastly, in Table 1.6 we add a richer covariate set to the MNL models predicting tran-
sitions and consider to what extent assigning immigrants the mean native values of these
covariates can eliminate the high-wage job gaps they face. Since predicting the full 5x5
transition matrix involves five separate MNL models (one for each origin state), we can as-
sign the natives values across all five origin states simultaneously (the results are reported
in the column labeled “All”) or we can limit it to a single origin state, so that only a
single column of the immigrant transition matrix is changed (these results are reported in
the remaining five columns). The first row of Table 1.6 reports immigrant high-wage rates
when no native values are assigned and the immigrant dummy is 1, which are essentially
predicted unconditional immigrant rates. These rates are 34.9% for men and 25.5% for
women. The final row of Table 1.6 reports the results when all native values are assigned
and the immigrant dummy is 0, which are essentially predicted unconditional rates for
natives. These rates are 39.1% for men and 39.5% for women.
The immigrant gaps in these unconditional rates in Table 1.6 are substantially smaller
than the conditional rates in Table 1.4, particularly for men. The results in the second
through fifth rows of Table 1.6 reveal that the age, education, marital status, and geography
of immigrants all contribute to moderating the immigrant disparity in high-wage jobs, but
their higher education levels are by far the most important. This is particularly true for
immigrant men, whose high-wage job rate decreases from 34.9% to 25.9% when they are
assigned natives’ mean education levels. The MNL estimates (not reported for the sake
11As usual we must maintain the condition that the columns sum to one. In the case of exits, this simply
means replacing the entire column. In the case of entries, the values of the remaining four elements of
each column are changed so as to maintain their relative proportionality.
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of brevity) reveal that the reason is that post-secondary schooling, particularly university
degrees, substantially reduce transition rates from high- to low-wage jobs. The question is
to what extent the job characteristics of immigrants, including industry and occupation,
or duration dependence in hazard rates into and out of high-wage jobs can account for the
fact that in comparing similarly-educated immigrants and natives, immigrants are so much
less likely to be employed in a high-wage job.
The results in Table 1.6 reveal that we are by and large unable to explain the shortfalls
in high-wage job rates of immigrant women. In no case does the counterfactual rate exceed
the unconditional rate of 25.5% by more than 1.1 percentage points. Even when we simul-
taneously assign immigrant women the industry mix, tenure levels, job search methods,
and incidence of having a future start or being on layoff, of native-born women – all the co-
variates that imply greater high-wage job rates for immigrant women in Table 1.6 – we still
predict a high-wage job rate of only 27.9%, far below the native rate of 39.5%. For men, on
the other hand, whose unconditional gap is substantially smaller to begin with, assigning
native values of covariates does in some cases, especially job tenure and the search methods
of the unemployed, bring the immigrant high-wage job rate very close to that of native-
born men (in the case of both tenure and search methods, 36.5% for immigrants compared
to 39.1% for natives). We think that the search methods result is particularly noteworthy
as it reflects relatively high immigrant use of passive search methods, specifically “checked
with friends or relatives”; “looked at job ads”; and “answered job ads”; all of which are
associated with significantly lower transitions of jobseekers directly into high-wage jobs. If
we simultaneously assign immigrant men native values of all the covariates that imply a
shortfall in their high-wage job rates – union status; temporary job status; industry mix;
tenure; search methods; and duration of unemployment – but allow them to keep their
own values for all the remaining covariates, most notably their higher education levels, we
predict a high-wage job rate of 40.1%, which is slightly higher than the native-born rate of
39.1%. In some sense then, we are able to account for the complete gap in the high-wage
job rate of immigrant men. But, of course, we are still unable to explain why in comparing
similarly aged and educated immigrants and natives with common job characteristics and
durations in their current jobs and in unemployment and joblessness, immigrant men still
face a disadvantage in high-wage jobs, and in particular in transition rates from high- to
low-wage jobs.
Arguably, the under-representation of immigrants in high-wage jobs is of less concern
if the rates tend to converge to those of natives with an immigrant’s years since migration,
than if the gaps are persistent over immigrants’ careers. We, therefore, complete our anal-
ysis by considering how the relative transition matrices of immigrants, and their implied
“ergodic” high-wage job rates, vary with age and an immigrant’s years since migration. To
do this we re-estimate the MNL models that condition on age, education, marital status,
and geography (Table 1.4), but add quadratic “age at migration” and “years since migra-
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tion” controls. All of the predicted rates shown in the bottom two panels of Figure 1.2
are obtained at the mean values of the native or immigrant covariates, except the age at
migration variable, which is held constant in the immigrant profile at age 24. The results
indicate that although job quality does tend to rise for both immigrant and native workers
over time, there is little (for men) or no (for women) narrowing of the immigrant gap in the
years following migration. This is perhaps surprising given evidence elsewhere of immigrant
assimilation (although modest) in overall wage rates (e.g., Baker and Benjamin 1994). A
shortcoming of our data is that we are unable to simultaneously control for cohort (i.e, year
of migration) effects, which could contaminate the estimated assimilation effects (Borjas
1985). However, the Canadian evidence suggests deteriorating immigrant “quality” across
arrival cohorts, which if anything should produce an upward bias in returns to years since
migration. In addition, when we estimate the same assimilation model using the overall
wage rate data in the LFS, we do find evidence of assimilation in overall wage rates (we
present the results in the top two panels of Figure 1.2). We are therefore doubtful that
unobserved heterogeneity across cohorts is driving our results. Rather we interpret our
results as evidence that the limited wage assimilation of Canadian immigrants is primarily
driven by improvements in individual productivity, rather than in job quality.
Although there is no evidence of assimilation in the overall high-wage job rates, there
may be assimilation in particular transition rates. In Figures 1.3 (men) and 1.4 (women)
we plot the age profiles for each of the 25 transitions in the usual 5x5 matrices. Perhaps
most interesting are the unemployment transitions, which for men show virtually iden-
tical immigrant and native transition rates into low-wage jobs at arrival in Canada, but
substantially lower transitions into high-wage jobs. However, high-wage transition rates
subsequently increase for immigrants while they tend to decline slightly for natives. And
low-wage transition rates from unemployment decrease for both immigrants and natives,
but considerably more quickly for immigrants. The convergence evident in the decreasing
high- to low-wage job transition rates for both immigrant men and women, similarly serves
to reduce the immigrant disparity in high-wage jobs. For men, in fact, the higher immi-
grant high- to low-wage job transition rate upon entry has almost entirely disappeared
twenty years after arrival.
More generally, there is much greater evidence of assimilation in transition rates across
the 25 possible transitions, than there is of diverging rates. This is particularly evident
in the relative flows of immigrant women out of the labor force, which tend to be much
higher at entry, but tend to decline to the rates of natives very quickly. Why then do
the high-wage job rates of immigrants not converge? The answer lies in both the low- to
high-wage transitions (LtHt+1) and the high-wage to self-employment transitions (HtSt+1).
For both immigrant men and women these rates tend to diverge with years since migration
and serve to increase the gaps in immigrant high-wage job rates. The welfare implications
of increasing self-employment transitions are, however, unclear. And it is similarly not
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obvious why the likelihood of making successful transition from low- to high-wage jobs
tends to decline more quickly with age for immigrants than natives. The patterns of
the low- to high-wage transition profiles for both immigrant men and women – that is,
relatively high rates of successful transitions soon after arrival which subsequently fall off
very quickly – are, however, entirely consistent with the popular perception of immigrants
getting stuck in low-quality jobs.
1.5 Conclusion
We exploit recently-introduced immigrant identifiers in the Canadian Labour Force Survey
(LFS) to examine the relative job and labor force dynamics of Canadian immigrants.
We are, in particular, interested in the role of job, as opposed to worker, heterogeneity
in driving the well-documented earnings disparities of Canada’s foreign-born population.
Our findings suggest that up to one-half of the shortfall in the average wage of immigrants,
when compared to similarly aged and educated native-born workers, can be accounted
for by the inferior quality of their jobs. Moreover, the data provide no evidence that
this gap in job quality closes with time since migration. This suggests to us that the
modest assimilation we see in the wage rates of Canadian immigrants, in both our data
and elsewhere, primarily reflects individual productivity gains, such as improvements in
language skills or accreditation of foreign educational credentials, as opposed to a process
of job shopping. It also suggests to us that policy initiatives that influence the quality of
immigrants’ jobs may have the greatest potential to advance the integration of immigrants
into Canadian labor markets.
What explains the under-representation of immigrants in high-wage jobs? Our main
finding is that the gap appears to reflect a combination of relatively low immigrant transi-
tions into high-wage jobs and high transitions out of these jobs, with the former difference
being relatively more important for immigrant women and the latter for immigrant men.
We suspect that the finding of relatively high outflows does more to challenge popular wis-
dom. Unfortunately, we are unable to say much about the nature or welfare implications
of the relative outflows. Certainly the difference in transition rates from high- to low-wage
primarily reflects transitions into low-wage jobs and self-employment and is substantially
moderated by the higher educational levels of immigrant men. However, in the absence
of information on the reasons for job separation, the relative importance of involuntary
displacement, as opposed to quits, in these transitions is unclear. Further analysis of
immigrant job retention data may be a fruitful area of future research.
With regard to the evidence on flows into high-wage jobs, we find that the differences
reflect both difficulties obtaining high-wage jobs directly out of unemployment and in
being able to successfully use low-wage jobs as stepping stones into high-wage jobs. The
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disparity in low- to high-wage job transitions appears particularly acute for immigrant
women and does not tend to diminish, unlike transitions directly from unemployment, with
years since migration. We do not, however, find any evidence of immigrant disparities in
unemployment transitions into low-wage jobs. In fact, for recently-arrived immigrant men,
unemployment to low-wage job transition rates are if anything slightly higher than those of
similarly aged and educated native-born men. Our results are therefore entirely consistent
with the notion of immigrants with low reservation wages, perhaps as a result of inadequate
income supports, getting stuck in low-quality “survival jobs”. They also suggest to us that
immigrant settlement policies directed exclusively at the unemployed (or underemployed)
will ultimately fall short in their attempt to further the labor integration of Canada’s
newest immigrants.12
12As an example, the main employment service of the Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Univer-
sities – Employment Ontario – explicitly limits eligibility (except in special cases) to their “assisted service”
components – job search, job matching, placement and incentives – to individuals who are unemployed
and not participating in full-time training or education. This program plays a particularly important
role in providing employment services to the province’s immigrant population through, for example, the
Newcomer Employment Centres of the YMCA located in cities throughout the province.
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Table 1.1: Immigrant differentials in mean log wage and job quality.
25 
 
 Men Women 
 Log wage Job quality Log wage Job quality 
Immigrant -0.2915*** -0.1410*** -0.3013*** -0.1564*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0036) (0.0056) (0.0037) 
Age  0.0463*** 0.0137*** 0.0395*** 0.0135*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0013) 
Age squared -0.0460*** -0.0133*** -0.0388*** -0.0127*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0016) 
(Elementary school)     
     
High school incomplete 0.0337** 0.0295*** 0.0364** 0.0161 
 (0.0128) (0.0071) (0.0140) (0.0089) 
High school graduate 0.1392*** 0.0845*** 0.2069*** 0.1211*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0069) (0.0129) (0.0084) 
Some post-secondary 0.1730*** 0.1175*** 0.2938*** 0.1773*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0077) (0.0141) (0.0092) 
Trade or college credential 0.2718*** 0.1793*** 0.3832*** 0.2426*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0067) (0.0127) (0.0083) 
University below Bachelor’s 0.3640*** 0.2620*** 0.5479*** 0.3558*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0097) (0.0155) (0.0101) 
Bachelor’s degree 0.4759*** 0.3391*** 0.6611*** 0.4377*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0072) (0.0131) (0.0085) 
Graduate degree 0.5937*** 0.4094*** 0.8108*** 0.5159*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0077) (0.0143) (0.0090) 
Married 0.1197*** 0.0670*** 0.0423*** 0.0194*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0024) 
Time trend 0.0012 0.0001 0.0010 -0.0003 
 (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) 
Time trend squared 0.0005 0.0002 0.0010 0.0013 
 (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0011) 
     
R-squared 0.2358 0.2299 0.2791 0.2625 
Number of observations 97,709 97,709 101,490 101,490 
     
(Unconditional differential) -0.1351*** -0.0573*** -0.1916*** -0.1045*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0038) (0.0059) (0.0038) 
Note: Regressions also include province and four rural/urban indicators. Samples are restricted to paid 
employees observed in the first month of their 6-month sample rotation. Standard errors are reported in 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































              
 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Can A Comparative Earnings
Advantage Account for the High
Self-Employment Rates of Canada’s
Immigrants?
2.1 Introduction
Self-employment accounts for a disproportionate share of the labour market activity of new
Canadian immigrants. The 2006 Census data show that 14% of prime-aged immigrants
were self-employed, compared to 12% among Canadian-born workers. Statistics Canada,
however, recently released the self-employment rate of new immigrants – those who arrived
in Canada less than 5 years ago – from 1981 to 1996, showing that the proportion of recent
immigrants who were self-employed doubled from 8% to 14% in that period. In contrast,
the proportion of self-employed Canadian-born workers remained at 13% over the same
period. From 1996 to 2005 immigrants continued to exhibit relatively high rates of self-
employment, although it decreased slightly after peaking in 1995 at 16%.
The current literature examining the determinants of immigrant self-employment pri-
marily looks at the static choice of the self- versus the paid-employment and focused on
the different propensities for self-employment between immigrants and native-born work-
ers. However, relatively few papers study the tendencies for immigrants to become self-
employed upon their arrival and over subsequent years following migration. Li (2001) and
Frenette (2004) use Canadian data to estimate standard assimilation-type models of im-
migrant self-employment rates. They demonstrate that recent cohorts of immigrants are
more likely to opt for self-employment shortly after arrival than were earlier cohorts of im-
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migrants. Moreover, unlike wages in the paid employment sector, which tend to converge
to that of the native-born over time, immigrant self-employment rates tend to increase
progressively in subsequent years and diverge from those of similarly-aged Canadian-born
workers. A limitation of these papers, however, is that they make no attempt to examine
why self-employment rates of new immigrants have tended to increase over time or why
they tend to diverge from those of Canadian-born workers in the years following migration.
A number of studies, all of them focusing on countries other than Canada, have at-
tempted to explain relatively high immigrant propensities for self-employment. A common
explanation is that immigrants are attracted to self-employment by a comparative advan-
tage in this sector. These papers point to possible immigrant-endowed abilities for self-
employment; their lack of fluency in the host country language; and the existence of ethnic
enclaves. Proponents of this view argue that ethnic enclaves provide a protected market
for immigrants to engage in self-employment, particularly when there is rapid growth in
the immigrant population, and hence concentration within a specific geographical loca-
tion. Immigrant entrepreneurs enjoy an advantage over potential competitors in seeking
the preferences of consumers in the enclave. Aldrich et al. (1985) argue that immigrants
are able to provide better ethnic goods and services, since they are aware of their own
culture’s specific tastes and have the skills and knowledge for their provision. For example,
certain immigrant groups are more productive in providing food, restaurant services and
approaches to medical treatment. In addition, immigrant entrepreneurs exhibit a competi-
tive advantage because they offer comfort and security by conducting transactions in their
own language. Some immigrants groups are linguistically distinct and thus they are limited
to jobs with lower incomes compared to workers who are fluent in the host country lan-
guage. The immigrant entrepreneurs from these groups, however, can be more profitable
in self-employment when they provide goods or services to co-ethnics who share the same
language. Using Australian data, Evans (1989) suggests that minorities with a greater
proportion of individuals who are not fluent in the English language will be more likely
to be business owners. Further, Lofstrom (2002) finds some evidence that the presence
and size of ethnic enclaves positively affect the probability of immigrants becoming self-
employed and that self-employed high-skilled immigrants do relatively better in the U.S.
labour market than immigrants working in the paid-employment sector.
The comparative advantage exhibited by immigrants in self-employment may give rise
to higher profits or economic returns, which are at least equivalent to those obtained from
the paid-employment sector. In order to test the effect of comparative advantage, several
papers in the existing literature empirically measure it as the earnings differentials between
self- and paid-employment. Rees and Shah (1986) simultaneously estimate a binary choice
model of self- versus paid-employment and earnings functions for each sector with a cor-
rection for selectivity. From the estimates of this model, they are able to predict potential
earnings differentials between the self- and the paid-employment sectors at the level of the
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individual worker. Using British data, they find evidence confirming that the probabil-
ity of self-employment depends positively on the potential earnings difference between the
two sectors. Using a similar approach, Taylor (1996) examines the role of this potential
earnings difference on the probability of becoming self-employed using British longitudinal
data. His results similarly show that the earnings advantage in self-employment is a major
attraction for individuals to self-employment.
This paper contributes to the current literature in two ways. First, using a much
larger and richer dataset than Li (2001) and Frenette (2004), I extend previous studies by
examining changes in the likelihood of self-employment across arrival cohorts of immigrants
and how self-employment rates evolve in the years following migration to Canada, and by
estimating the potential earnings difference between the self- and the paid-employment
sectors. Compared to Frenette (2004), I analyze immigrant earnings outcomes relative
to the native-born across, instead of within, sectors. As a result, I am able to correct
for the selectivity issues associated with the choice of sectors. Second, this study is the
first in the Canadian literature to study the impact of an earnings advantage on immigrant
propensities for self-employment, both upon arrival and in the years following migration. In
other words, I explore the implications of the patterns of a comparative earnings advantage
on the choice of self-employment in the immigrant population.
Pooling Canadian Census Public Use Microdata Files (PUMFs) between 1981 and
2006, I identify 100,767 and 433,435 observations on immigrants and the native-born,
respectively, after restricting the sample to men ranging in age from 25 to 54 who worked
on a full-year and full-time basis in the calendar year preceding the Census. In order to
estimate the likelihood of self-employment, I begin by examining the unconditional self-
employment rates, relative to the native-born, through time for each arrival cohort. I then
estimate the predicted self-employment probabilities according to a probit model, which is
run on a wide set of personal demographic and family characteristics, including age and
its square, educational credentials, marital status, the presence of children, the number of
children, the wife’s total income and a series of industry, geography and year dummies.
Subsequently, I examine the extent to which a comparative advantage in self-employment,
captured by the difference in potential earnings between the self- and paid-employment sec-
tors, can account for the tremendous shift toward self-employment observed in Canada’s
immigrant population. Immigrants from Canada’s traditional immigrant source regions –
the U.S., U.K., Europe, Caribbean and Oceania – are distinguished from non-traditional
source regions – Asia and Africa. Generally, traditional immigrants are English-speakers.
Thus we can reasonably expect that their language proficiency make it easier for them
to find a wage job than the non-traditional immigrants who lack language skills. Also,
traditional immigrants tend not to be visible minorities so we expect them to face less
employer discrimination in the labour market. As a result, these two types of immigrants
may experience very different earnings profiles and they are accordingly distinguished in
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the estimation of the earnings functions. Following the approach of Taylor (1996), I am
able to obtain predicted potential earnings in both the self- and paid-employment sectors
for each individual observed in the data and correct for the selectivity. Then, a structural
probit model, including the predicted difference in log earnings between the two sectors as
regressor, is used to investigate how the potential earnings difference affects immigrants’
likelihood of self-employment. Finally, I predict the earnings difference for each arrival
cohort of traditional and non-traditional immigrants and present the key implications of
the differences in the patterns of an earnings advantage on the choice of self-employment,
for both traditional and non-traditional immigrants.
My findings indicate that Canada’s most recent immigrants, who arrived between 1996
and 2005, are more likely to turn to self-employment than earlier cohorts of immigrants.
In addition, self-employment rates of all cohorts of immigrants tend to rise relative to
observably-identical Canadian-born workers as immigrants have been residing in Canada.
Although both types of immigrants show a higher likelihood of self-employment with the
increase of predicted self-employment earnings relative to paid earnings, this earnings dif-
ference appears to more significantly affect the choice of becoming self-employed in the
non-traditional immigrant population. More important, there is an earnings advantage
in self-employment for traditional immigrants, which has tended to increase within immi-
grant cohorts. Therefore, the tendency of increasing self-employment rates over time for
traditional immigrants can be explained by the comparative earnings advantage in terms
of a more rapid growth of self-employment earnings. Once this earnings advantage is con-
trolled for, the tendency for self-employment in the years following migration disappears.
However, the earnings difference cannot explain the reason non-traditional immigrants
become increasingly likely to be self-employed as they consistently lose an earnings ad-
vantage over time in the self-employment sector relative to the paid-employment sector.
For recent non-traditional immigrants who arrived between 1996 and 2005, the higher
self-employment rates at entry relative to the native born can be explained by higher
levels of self-employment earnings by working more hours in this sector. Finally, I find
some evidence that immigrants have barriers accessing paid-employment and hence self-
employment is their “option of last resort”. However, my findings can not exclude the
possibility that the higher likelihood of self-employment is either affected by an attraction
such as independence and freedom, or by the host-country culture related to propensity
for self-employment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section I discuss
the current literature on the self-employment experiences of immigrants arriving in Canada
and on the impact of a comparative advantage in self-employment on the choice of self-
employment. I describe the empirical strategies to identify the incidence of self-employment
and estimate the earnings difference between the self- and the paid-employment sectors in
Section 3. Section 4 describes the data and Section 5 discusses the results. Finally, Section
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6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Literature Review
To date, relatively few papers emerge in the current literature that explore the process
of entry and assimilation into self-employment experienced by Canadian immigrants. Li
(2002) examines data from the Longitudinal Immigration Data Base (IMDB) in Canada
from 1980 to 1995, which contain information on immigrants’ landing year, age, gender,
class of admission, country of last permanent residence, educational credentials at landing
and language ability. Li presents a descriptive analysis to show how immigrant propensities
for self-employment vary across entry cohorts and over time. He further demonstrates
how self-employment rates vary by characteristics of immigrants in subsequent years after
migration. Finally, a logistic regression model is employed to identify which immigrant
characteristics contribute to the likelihood of being self-employed. The results show that
the likelihood of participation in self-employment is higher as immigrants reside in Canada
longer and that new cohorts of immigrants who arrived in the 1990s were more likely
to engage in self-employment than earlier cohorts of immigrants. The logistic regression
model further demonstrates that immigration during good economic conditions, older age
and higher educational qualifications enhance the incidence of self-employment in Canada.
The shortcoming of these data is that they contain no observations on native-born workers,
which is often used as the benchmark group in the analysis of immigrant self-employment
rates. Without a base group, there is no way of determining if changes observed over
time are common to all workers or specific to immigrants. Therefore, we can eliminate
the secular trend common to all workers by netting of the changes that occurred in the
native-born.
Frenette (2004) uses Canadian Census data between 1981 and 1996, which include
observations on both immigrants and the native-born to study the likelihood of self-
employment and relative earnings for immigrants in both paid- and self-employment sec-
tors. He finds that the proportion of self-employed male immigrants has grown in successive
cohorts and that immigrants in the early 1990s have higher propensity for self-employment
than the cohorts of immigrants who arrived in the late 1970s. In addition, immigrant self-
employment rates are increasing in years after migration. He then examines the earnings of
immigrants in both sectors, demonstrating that the more recent cohorts of immigrants have
fared poorly relative to the native-born in the paid-employment sector while the earnings
gap between immigrants and the native-born remains quite stable in the self-employment
sector. His study concentrates on the earnings of immigrants within each sector relative
to the native-born rather than the impact of the potential earnings difference between the
two sectors on the entry to self-employment, as is the focus of this chapter.
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The most recent Canadian research in this area is by Schuetze (2010) who examines
immigrant self-employment in both the U.S. and Canada. His findings suggest that in both
countries there has been positive and statistically significant growth in the self-employment
rates of new arrival cohorts and that immigrant self-employment rates tend to increase
in subsequent years after arrival. Furthermore, the relative intra-cohort growth of self-
employment rates tend to occur in the first ten to fifteen years after migration for those who
arrived after 1970, while previous cohorts experienced increases in self-employment rates at
a later time. This result roughly coincided with changes in Canadian immigration policy,
which introduced the points system in the late 1960s. Meanwhile, the findings show that
more recent immigrant cohorts, upon entry, have self-employment rates closer to Canadian-
born entrepreneurs while previous cohorts enter Canada with lower self-employment rates
than the native-born. In particular, the gap between self-employment rates of immigrants
at time of entry and the native-born fell substantially in the period between 1986 and 1996.
This is consistent with the creation of the “business” class of immigrants in the early 1980s.
Taylor (1996) examines how self-employment in England is driven by three main con-
siderations: the potential earnings difference between the self- and the paid-employment
sectors; independence; and unemployment. When estimating the potential earnings dif-
ference, he employs a similar approach to Rees and Shah (1986). The benefit of indepen-
dence offered by self-employment is non-pecuniary. The classic example is “being your own
boss”: individuals attach intrinsic value to independence since they can derive more utility
from working for themselves than working for others. The unemployment level represents
an important macro-economic factor and may impact the choice of self-employment, al-
though its influence is inconclusive in the literature. For example, Audretsch and Evans
(1994) suggest that high unemployment levels lead to fewer jobs being offered in the paid-
employment sector and result in higher propensity for self-employment as a substitute.
Conversely, Oswald (1991a) finds evidence that low unemployment rates may attract in-
dividuals to self-employment since they know it is easy to find a paid job even if they fail
in their own business. Taylor (1996) suggests that independence attracts individuals to
self-employment as does the potential earnings advantage in the self-employment sector,
while high unemployment levels do not impact the choice of self-employment.
Using the American Survey of Income and Program Participation, covering a period
from 1983 to 1986, Hamilton (2000) attempts to explain the earnings difference between the
self- and the paid-employment sectors. His findings show that individuals tend to persist
in the self-employment sector despite lower initial earnings and lower earnings growth than
paid employees with the same observed characteristics. The earnings differentials cannot
be explained by the selection of low-ability workers into self-employment since the average
earnings of paid employees are less than the predicted earnings of entrepreneurs had they
been the paid employees. However, Hamilton concludes that the self-employment earnings
differential reflects individuals’ willingness to sacrifice substantial earnings in exchange for
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freedom or independence.
Lastly, Clark and Drinkwater (2002) explore the higher propensity for self-employment
among ethnic minorities in England and Wales by examining both pull and push factors.
They argue that ethnic minorities are either forced into self-employment by employer dis-
crimination (a push factor), or are attracted toward self-employment by push factors such
as positive attitude toward self-employment related to religion and a comparative advan-
tage (or productivity) in the provision of ethnic goods and services to the customers in
the enclave. They outline a theoretical model incorporating the potential earnings dif-
ference between the two sectors and other variables, including proxies for religion and
ethnic enclaves. The results indicate that the difference of predicted earnings between
the self- and the paid-employment sectors exerts a powerful influence on the likelihood of
self-employment.
2.3 Methodology
Analysis is performed relative to native-born counterparts, given that the estimates will be
biased when unobserved economic conditions change over the twenty-five year period. A
common solution in the literature is to adjust immigrant outcomes with a base group. For
example, Borjas (1986) normalized the immigrant incidence of self-employment by using
the native-born as a benchmark. This section begins with the discussion of the binary
probit model used to estimate the probability of being self-employed and then turns to an
endogenous switching model used to address the sample selection bias in the estimation of
earnings in both sectors. Finally, a structural probit model will be described as it examines
the earnings differential effect on the decision of self-employment.
Since each individual has two choices in the labour market – to become a paid employee
or self-employed worker – the self-employment probability can be estimated through a
binary probit model. I employ a standard empirical assimilation-type approach in the
literature based on the work of Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985). This model is primarily
used in studies of immigrant wage assimilation and typically includes a set of arrival cohort
dummies and a function of YSM to identify immigrant entry earnings and assimilation
processes, respectively. Correspondingly, I apply this approach into binary probit model
to estimate immigrant self-employment rates for each arrival cohort of immigrants and their
change with the accumulation of YSM. In particular, previous studies have suggested that
immigrants become increasingly likely to choose self-employment as they have been residing
in Canada. Hence, a quadratic function of YSM is included to capture the tendency of
immigrant self-employment rates in the years following migration. As a result, the binary
probit model is given by:
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Pr(Y = 1) = Φ
[
β0 + β1AGE + β2AGE
2 + βX + γZ +m · (δ0 +
k∑
2
δjCj + α1AGE + α2AGE




where Pr(Y = 1) is the probability of being self-employed; AGE is the age of respondent
at the reference year; Cj are 7 cohort dummies identifying the period of arrival; Y SM is
years since migration; m is immigrant dummy variable; and µ is an identically distributed
error term. The cohort dummies and YSM are always equal to zero for the native-born. In
addition, X represents other typical variables which may affect the self-employment choice
and Z are instrumental variables, which also affect the propensity for self-employment,
but not earnings. Specifically, variables in X include marital status, industry indicator
variables, geography indicators and years dummies. Variables in Z include the wife’s total
income, the presence of a child and the number of children.
Estimating equation (2.1) on a pooled sample of immigrants and natives, we can inter-
pret the estimates of Cj as the self-employment entry rate of cohort j relative to the earliest
cohort, after controlling for X and Z. The quadratic term of YSM provides evidence of the
extent to which immigrant self-employment rates evolve with more years spent in the host
country labour market. The quadratic function of age is included as I expect the older
workers may be more capable to invest a business due to the accumulated wealth and
stronger interpersonal relationship, compared to the younger workers. By interacting the
age and immigrant dummy variable, it allows for different changes to age for immigrants
and natives as an immigrant may have different preference on the choice of self-employment
compared with a similarly-aged native-born worker.
The second key focus of this paper is to estimate the earnings of immigrants in the self-
and paid-employment sectors and then examine the impact of potential earnings difference
between the two sectors on the choice of self-employment. The earnings equation, which
is estimated separately in each sector, is given by:
log(W ) = γ0 + γ1AGE + γ2AGE





2 + ω3Y SM + ω4Y SM
2) + ε (2.2)
where log(w) is the log of weekly earnings and all other variables in equation (2.2) have
the same definition as equation (2.1). Similarly, I can interpret the coefficients of Cj as the
entry earnings of cohort j relative to the earliest cohort. The quadratic function of YSM
reveals the extent to which immigrants assimilate into host country labour market in terms
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of earnings. In the earnings equation, age is the proxy of potential working experience and
its quadratic function can capture the diminishing returns to experience. By interacting
the age and immigrant dummy variable, it allows for different returns to age for immigrants
and natives. Since foreign experience of immigrants may not be equally transferred into
the Canadian labour market, I would expect immigrants to have smaller returns to age
profile than the native-born.
The econometric problem faced here is that an individual can only be observed in one of
the two sectors and thus their earnings in the other sector are not available. Moreover, men
who choose to be a paid-employee or self-employed are unlikely to have made the choice
on a random basis and thus there is a selection bias. The common way of overcoming the
selectivity problem is to use the Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model, which includes
the sample selectivity term (inverse Mills’ ratio) in the earnings equations. However, this
method is not efficient and the derivation of consistent standard error is computationally
burdensome. I will implement the full information maximum likelihood method (FIML)
to simultaneously estimate the probit and earnings equations in order to yield consistent
standard errors. This approach is called Endogenous Switching Regression (ESR), which
sorts individuals over two different states with one regime observed.
With the method of ESR, the identification of the earnings equations depends on ex-
clusion restrictions, that is, omitting at least one variable that appear in equation (2.1). I
dropped the variables in Z, which are assumed to only affect the choice of self-employment
but do not determine earnings in any sector. In practice, I include the presence of a child,
the number of children; and the wife’s total income as the instruments. The first two
variables have been used in other studies estimating a similar type of model (Taylor 1996;
Dolton and Makepeace 1990), which argue that parents with more children need more
flexible time to care for their children.
The results of earnings equations could be sensitive to the choice of instruments. Hence,
I tried some other instrumental variables. For example, some papers use home equity since
it could capture the amount of assets and indicate the ability to obtain a loan. However, the
Census data only provides information on the house value and not home equity. I attempted
to substitute the house value for home equity and the estimates suggest that individuals in
possession of more expensive homes are reluctant to enter the self-employment sector. The
results contradict my expectation, and in actuality, the house value cannot capture the
original implication indicated by home equity. Further, I compared the results with and
without the use of house value. The negligible changes in the estimates of other variables
suggest that results are not sensitive to this variable.
On the other hand, I use the wife’s total income as instrumental variable. The defini-
tion of wife’s total income is conditional on the status of census family. For a male spouse
or common-law partner, the wife’s total income is derived by subtracting the husband’s
total income from the family’s total income. However, for a man who is single, lone par-
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ent or non-family person, the wife’s total income is always equal to zero.1 I expect that
the wife’s total income is able to influence the husband’s participation in self-employment
sector by providing an alternative source of wealth to start a business. Or alternatively, a
significantly high level of spousal total income sufficiently secure the family’s basic suste-
nance so that men are capable of making more risky and ambitious career endeavours in
the self-employment sector. Moreover, the descriptive results in Table 2.1 show that wives
of both groups of immigrants earn significantly higher income compared with those of the
native-born, which may, to some extent, explain why immigrant men are more likely to be
self-employed. On the other hand, I expect that the incomes of wives do not determine the
levels of husbands’ earnings in any employment sector in my sample. Some papers argue
that the individual may not participate in the labour force or reduce the hours of work
with the increase of the spouse’s income. However, my sample is restricted to men working
on a full-time and full-year basis, which excludes the consideration of family labour supply.
Consequently, the wife’s total income has nothing with the husband’s earnings and it can
be eliminated from the earnings equations.
These exclusion restrictions enable me to obtain the predicted earnings in both the paid-
and self-employment sectors for each individual observed in the data. The final step is to
assess the impact of the predicted earnings differentials on the choice of self-employment
and the structural probit model with the earnings difference included, is given by:
Pr(Y = 1) = Φ
[
ϑ0( ̂log(Ws)− ̂log(Wp)) + β0 + β1AGE + β2AGE2 +
βX
′
+ γZ +m · (ϑ1( ̂log(Ws)− ̂log(Wp)) + δ0 +
k∑
2
δjCj + α1AGE + α2AGE




where ̂log(Ws) − ̂log(Wp) is the difference of predicted log earnings between two forms
of employment and X
′
are the same covariance sector as X except a series of industry
dummies. In other words, industry indicator dummies, which enter in the probit model and
the earnings equations, are omitted from the structural probit model, for the identification
purpose. More important, the coefficient of the predicted earnings difference (ϑ0) indicates
the impact of an earnings advantage on the native-born determination of choosing self-
employment. The magnitude is (ϑ0 +ϑ1) in the immigrant decision affected by an earnings
advantage.
1In my model, I include the log of wife’s total income in the model. Since many wives do not work
and have zero income, I assign zero value to the log of wife’s total income. As a result, this manipulation
will decrease the means of log of wife’s total income, compared with the log of the means of wife’s total
income, as shown in Table 2.1.
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2.4 Data
The data used in this study are drawn from the Canadian Census Public Use Microdata
Files (PUMFs) conducted in 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006. These data provide a
sufficient sample size of immigrants to distinguish differences across arrival cohorts and be-
tween traditional and non-traditional source countries. In addition, these data provide the
necessary information on sources of the income in both the paid- and the self-employment
sectors, which allows me to identify the class of worker in the calendar year preceding the
year of the Census.
The sample consists of male permanent residents, between 25 and 54 years of age,
who worked for a full-year, on a full-time basis in the calendar year preceding the year
of the Census. More specifically, the male workers must have worked 30 hours or more
per week for at least 48 weeks in one year. These restrictions can effectively exclude the
labour supply considerations as much as possible and concentrate on workers with a strong
attachment to the labour market.
Immigrants are identified by their country of birth. Any individual born outside of
Canada is defined as an immigrant. In order to identify the entry effect, immigrants are
also categorized into cohorts by arrival time in Canada. For the purpose of this study, the
earliest cohort of immigrants is those who arrived before 1971 and another seven cohorts
are examined, which are 1971-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-
2000 and 2001-2005. Moreover, a significant shift in the source regions of immigrants
occurred during the past fifty years, which may affect the likelihood of self-employment
across cohorts and over time. Specifically, the proportions of immigrants coming from the
traditional source regions are 80%, 46%, 38%, 28%, 21%, 21%, 25% and 23% across the
eight arrival cohorts, respectively.
It is important to take class of immigrant admission into account when examining immi-
grants’ likelihood of self-employment and their earnings in this sector. The immigrants who
enter under the business class including investor, entrepreneur and self-employed categories,
directly influence the self-employment rates given that many of the business immigrants
are required to maintain a business of some form upon entry to Canada. For example, im-
migrants entering under the investor stream are required to make an investment to develop
economy and create jobs.
The Longitudinal Immigration Data Base (IMDB) used by Li (2002) contain informa-
tion on class of admission. In contrast, the census data do not distinguish immigrants into
different categories. However, I plot the the change of business immigration from 1980
to 2006 in Figure 2.1 from the published data from Citizenship and Immigration Canada.
Between 1980 and 1994, the proportion of business class immigrants steadily increased
from 3.6% to 13.3%. Thus, there was substantial growth in the representation of business
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immigrants over this period and I expect that this led to increases in self-employment
propensities among immigrants. However, the proportion of business class immigrants de-
clined from 9.8% to 5.1% from 1995 to 2006. The rapid decrease may be caused by the
sudden increase of immigrants under the provincial nominee programs (PNPs) introduced
in the late of 1990s. This program also includes a large portion of business immigrants. The
dashed line indicates the summation of immigrants under both business class and PNPs.
For instance, it shows that the percentage of immigrants under these two classes reach
10.8% of total immigrants in 2006. The increasing pattern from 1999 to 2006 suggests that
immigrant self-employment rates may remain at a relatively high level on average due to
the composition of immigrants admitted by business class and PNPs during this period.
In general, the literature has two ways to define self-employment, either by respondents’
self-identification or by sources of income. Although the respondents are directly asked
whether they are a paid-employee or self-employed in their primary job in the Census
reference week, they are not required to report any earnings for that week. This paper will
examine not only the immigrant probabilities of being self-employed relative to Canadian-
born, but also the earnings in both sectors. Consequently, self-employment is defined by
the sources of income in the previous year.
I follow the approach of Frenette (2004) to define self-employment. Specifically, any
male worker who has self-employment income of at least 80 percent of the total market
earnings (the sum of the paid- and self-employed earnings) is classified as self-employed in
this study, given that self-employed earnings are positive. Similarly, a worker is considered
to be a paid-employee if the earnings derived from the paid employment are at least 80
percent of the total market earnings. As a result, the intermediate group who spent
considerable amounts of time in both types of employment were eliminated. However, this
limitation is not costly as only 1.6% of observations fell into the intermediate category.
This left me with 100,767 immigrants and 433,435 Canadian-born.2
Aside from immigrant and self-employment dummy variables, other demographic and
economic variables typically used in the previous research on the determinants of self-
employment are also included. In this study, the determinants are: age as quadratic;
indicator variables for the highest level of education completed; indicator variable for mar-
ital status; and a series of dummy variables for the industry and geography.
Age acts as a proxy for work experience to capture the diminishing return to experience
in the earnings equation. Educational attainment is also important as it may provide the
2The sample size includes the child immigrants, who arrived in Canada before the age of 12. I did not
delete these observations due to the inconsistent age categories on the definition of age at migration in
the 2006 Census PUMF. Moreover, I tried to eliminate the immigrants who arrived in Canada before the
age of 12 surveyed between 1981 and 2001, and the immigrants who migrated in Canada before the age of
14 observed in the 2006 Census. The results on the propensity for self-employment and the tendency of
predicted earnings difference over time are not sensitive to this sample limitation.
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necessary skills to succeed and it determines the return to earnings. Thus a set of dummy
variables for educational credentials are included. Previous research has found that indi-
viduals in married families are more inclined to choose self-employment since the other
adult members can help to take better care of a family business. In addition, 14 groups
of industry, based on the 1980 standard industry classification, are included. They are
primary industry, manufacturing, construction, transportation, communication/utilities,
wholesale trade, retail trade, finance/insurance, educational service, business services, gov-
ernment services, accommodation/food and other services. Finally, a series of regional
and year dummy variables are used to proxy the economic conditions that may influence
the choice of self-employment and the earnings of those who participate in this sector.
Specifically, regional dummies include the Atlantic provinces, Montreal and other parts of
Quebec, Toronto and other parts of Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Calgary and other
parts of Alberta, Vancouver, and other parts of British Columbia.
The means of these variables are shown in Table 2.1. Since much of the analysis that
follows focuses on the outcomes of two types of immigrants, relative to the native-born, the
descriptive statistics are presented for traditional immigrants, non-traditional immigrants
and the native-born, respectively. My sample consists of 9.2% traditional immigrants and
9.6% non-traditional immigrants. Compared with the native-born, both types of immi-
grants are more educated, more concentrated in Toronto and Vancouver, and considerably
more likely to work in manufacturing, business services, and accommodation/food indus-
tries. Furthermore, immigrants have higher rates of marriage and have more children and
their wives have more total income than those of the native-born. If these demographic
and family characteristics impact the decision on self-employment, the comparison between
immigrants and the native-born should account for these differences.
Table 2.1 demonstrates some meaningful labour market outcomes. First, both types
of immigrants have higher self-employment rates than the native-born. On average, the
traditional and non-traditional immigrants, who choose self-employment, are 9.4% and
8.6%, respectively, while only 7.9% of the natives work for themselves. Second, traditional
immigrants have the highest earnings in both the paid- and self-employment sectors. The
logs of weekly paid earnings and self-employed earnings are 6.88 and 6.42, which are slightly
higher than the Canadian-born whose means in two sectors are 6.83 and 6.39, respectively.
Comparatively, non-traditional immigrants experience considerably lower earnings in both
sectors, which are only 6.64 and 6.28, respectively. This distinct difference in the earnings
gives evidence that it is important to control for the types of immigrants in the earnings
equations. Third, both groups of immigrants and native workers have on average an
earnings disadvantage in the self-employment sector due to the negative values of the
earnings difference between two sectors. In other words, everyone earn less in the self-
employment sector compared to the paid employment sector on average. However, non-
traditional immigrants have the smallest earnings difference, followed by the native-born
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and traditional immigrants. Consequently, the non-traditional immigrants have an earnings
advantage in the self-employment sector relative to Canadian-born workers. It implies that
non-traditional immigrants may be attracted to self-employment by a comparative earnings
advantages in this sector.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 The relative incidence of immigrant self-employment
The descriptive results on the unconditional relative probabilities of self-employment are
presented in Figure 2.2.3 The vertical axis represents the observed difference in the likeli-
hood of self-employment among immigrants and the native-born. Positive values indicate
higher self-employment rates for immigrants than the native-born, and vice-versa for neg-
ative values.
In Figure 2.2, we can see that there are substantial differences in self-employment
levels for immigrants and the native-born. Since most differences are positive, it shows
that immigrants, in general, are more likely to be self-employed. In addition, the entry
effect can be observed by comparing new immigrants, who have lived in Canada for less
than 5 years. The first bar of each cohort represents new immigrants’ self-employment
rates relative to their native counterparts with the exception of the 1971-75 cohort. Due to
data limitations, we cannot observe the entry effect for this cohort and its first bar shows
the relative self-employment probability when this cohort stayed more than five years,
but less than 10 years, in the Canadian labour market. Figure 2.2 illustrates that the
first bars become more positive across successive cohorts, excepting that new immigrants
of the 1986-90 cohort are less likely to enter the self-employment sector than the earlier
cohorts. This trend demonstrates recent cohorts of immigrants are more apt to choose
self-employment upon arrival in Canada. The assimilation effect can be ascertained by
following the bars within a given cohort. It suggests that immigrants become more likely
to turn to self-employment after residing for a time in Canada.
Considering that immigrants exhibit different demographic and family characteristics
from the native-born, it is important to control for these factors. Equation (2.1) is able
to estimate the probability of self-employment for seven cohorts of immigrants, relative
to the native-born. A typical approach is to evaluate this difference at the same values
3I did not separate traditional immigrants from non-traditional immigrants in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3
in order to make these results comparable with those of Frenette (2004). More important, I estimate the
likelihood of self-employment for both types of immigrants, as shown in Table 2.2 and the results suggest
that both category of immigrants exhibit similar tendencies to self-employment across arrival cohorts and
over time.
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of independent variables, represented by X and Z in equation (2.1), for both immigrants
and natives. Accordingly, I assign the average characteristics of immigrants to the native-
born except the YSM variable. The native-born always have the zero value of YSM, while
immigrants have the different YSM across arrival cohorts and over time. More succinctly,
the YSM is equal to the sample means of YSM for a certain cohort at a given year.
The predicted probabilities of being self-employed, relative to the native-born is illus-
trated in Figure 2.3. This graph illustrates similar results as Figure 2.2. First, it indicates
that immigrants have, on average, higher levels of self-employment rates relative to the
native-born since most bars are positively labelled. In particular, the three most recent
cohorts (1991-95, 1996-00 and 2000-05) of new immigrants always possess positive gaps,
implying that recent cohorts of immigrants are more likely to be self-employed upon arrival
in Canada compared to earlier cohorts.
With respect to the entry effect, we can see that the first bars become more positive
with the arrival of new immigrants. Within the first five years of arrival, the 1976-80 cohort
has the biggest negative gap, indicating that early cohorts of immigrants were less likely
to be self-employed upon entry. By 1990, however, the 1991-95 cohort begins to have a
positive value, showing that they have higher self-employment rates than the native-born
during the first five years in Canada. Furthermore, this tendency is strengthened by the
more recent cohorts of immigrants. New immigrants who arrive in Canada between 1996
and 2005 demonstrate a strong propensity for self-employment upon entry with higher
relative self-employment rates. With respect to the assimilation effect, the bars within
any cohort rise moderately through time. This pattern shows that immigrants exhibit an
unambiguous increase in self-employment rates relative to the native-born with more time
spent in Canada.
With respect to the metropolitan effect, Toronto has higher self-employment rates than
other big cities such as Montreal, Vancouver and Calgary. Meanwhile, there are higher
probabilities of self-employment in Manitoba and Saskatchewan than in other provinces.
Compared to Figure 2.2, the results that self-employment rates have tended to increase
with the arrival of new immigrants and they subsequently tend to diverge from those of
Canadian-born workers consistently hold. Thus, I infer that the relatively higher immigrant
propensities for self-employment are not driven by immigrant demographic characteristics.
As mentioned, when I estimate the conational relative immigrant self-employment rates
with equation (2.1), I control for the YSM variable and its square. An alternative approach
is to specify cohort and survey specific intercepts as Borjas’ original study of immigrants’
assimilation, which excludes YSM variable from the model. I also take this approach to
estimate the conditional self-employment rates for both immigrants and natives. This
approach also suggests that the self-employment rates tend to rise across arrival cohorts of
immigrants and with years since migration. Therefore, the results on immigrant relative
self-employment rates are robust and do not vary with different approaches.
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2.5.2 Immigrant earnings outcomes in two forms of employment
In this section, traditional immigrants and non-traditional immigrants are distinguished
because they experience much different entry earnings and earnings growth. Therefore, a
series of traditional and non-traditional cohort dummies are included in the earnings equa-
tions. The approach of ESR simultaneously estimates the likelihood of self-employment
and earnings equations, with results shown separately in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3.
Table 2.2 reports the coefficients of reduced-form probit model as well as their marginal
probabilities.4 While the magnitudes of coefficients in the probit model are not very mean-
ingful, the marginal effect is interpreted as the change in the probability for an infinitesimal
change in continuous variables or the discrete change in the probability for dummy vari-
ables. These results coincide with those presented in Figure 2.3. Specifically, the gradually
increased magnitudes of marginal probabilities across a set of cohort dummies show that
self-employment rates for both types of immigrants tend to increase with arrival of new
immigrants. Also, the significantly positive marginal probabilities of YSM for both groups
of immigrants indicate that immigrant likelihood of self-employment increases as YSM
accumulates.
As expected, the results also reveal that age has a diminishing positive effect on the
probability of self-employment along with accumulated entrepreneurial abilities and capital
for investment. In addition, the log of wife’s total income has a significant and positive
effect on the choice of self-employment. If the wife’s total income is enhanced by 1%, the
probability of the husband’s choice of self-employment is expected to increase by 0.1%.
Simultaneously, individuals with a child are less likely to be self-employed than those
without a child. However, individuals with two or more children in the family are more
inclined to enter the self-employment sector.
Table 2.3 shows the results of earnings equations in both sectors, corrected for selec-
tivity. Non-traditional immigrants show a sudden decline in the self-employment sector
across consecutive cohorts, which is even bigger than the decrease in the paid earnings.
On the other hand, earnings in both sectors slightly increased for the earlier cohorts of
traditional immigrants, but dropped quickly for recent cohorts. Traditional immigrants
also experience more decrease of entry earnings in the self-employment sector relative to
the paid employment sector.
The earnings equations also suggest that there is an earnings growth for both types
of immigrants, due to their significant and positive estimates of YSM in the two sec-
tors. In particular, self-employed earnings for traditional immigrants grow more quickly
4Since quadratic functions of age and YSM and their interaction terms are included in the probit
model, the marginal effects for these variables and the standard errors have been computed taking these
nonlinearities into account. Specifically, I use additional programming in STATA with the command
“predictnl”.
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than paid earnings with the accumulation of YSM. This outcome suggests an compara-
tive earnings advantage in the self-employment sector, which may explain why traditional
immigrants have an increasing trend toward self-employment in the years following mi-
gration. Conversely, non-traditional immigrants experience slightly higher growth of paid
earnings than self-employment earnings. Yet, these results cannot explain the observation
that non-traditional immigrants are more likely to be self-employed with more time spent
in Canada. This contradiction implies that non-traditional immigrants may not be at-
tracted to the self-employment sector by earnings superiority, but choose self-employment
of necessity.
Finally, the last row in Table 2.3 shows the effect of unmeasured characteristics, reported
by the coefficient of correlation (rho). It provides insight on the relationship between the
error terms in the probit model and earnings equations. The error terms in the earnings
equation contain the unobserved worker quality, which contribute to measured earnings.
For example, individuals may possess positive attitudes toward work, which, in turn, lead
them to obtain higher earnings in any sector. Simultaneously, the error terms in the choice
of self-employment may include workers’ exceptional confidence and ambition for success.
The significant and positive coefficients of correlation suggest that individuals with more
ambition may work harder and thus they have higher earnings in the self-employment
sector. Therefore, there is selection bias on the choice of employment sectors.
2.5.3 The impact of earnings difference on the choice of self-
employment
Given that the earnings equations predict earnings in both sectors for each individual, the
potential earnings difference between the two sectors is derived from the predicted log of
self-employed earnings subtracted by the predicted log of paid earnings. In this section, I
begin with elaborating on the patterns of the earnings difference and afterward show how
these patterns affect the decision of self-employment for each category of immigrants.
Table 2.4 shows the most important and interesting results of this chapter, that is the
earnings difference between two sectors for both groups of immigrants and native workers.
Specifically, the upper panel in Table 2.4 displays the earnings difference between the self-
and the paid-employment sectors for each group of immigrants across consecutive arrival
cohorts over a period of twenty-five years (DDM). The middle panel shows the earnings
difference of observably-identical native workers (DDN). The lower panel refers to the
earnings difference of immigrants, relative to the native-born (DDM -DDN).
The values of DDM and DDN are computed at the same demographic characteristics
for all workers,5 based on the results of Table 2.3. Table 2.4 suggests that everyone earns
5In this estimation, YSM are different for the native-born and workers. The native-born always have
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less in the self-employment sector compared to the paid employment sector as all values
of DDM and DDN are negative, regardless of YSM and year. In other words, both groups
of immigrants and native workers have an earnings disadvantage in the self-employment
sector. However, the non-traditional immigrants’ earnings disadvantage is smallest in the
self-employment sector on average in that their gaps are comparatively smaller than those
of traditional immigrants and the native-born. These results suggest that non-traditional
immigrants, generally, have higher likelihood of self-employment than natives and tradi-
tional immigrants.
The tendency of an earnings difference over time also have the implications on the
decision of self-employment for each type of immigrants. By following the potential earn-
ings difference of traditional immigrants, we can see that the earnings differences become
more negative through time, although the gaps in 1991 and 2001 are smaller than those in
1986 and 1996, respectively. The earnings difference of the native-born exhibits the same
pattern as traditional immigrants, but they experience a bigger decline through time. For
example, the earnings difference across sectors drops 0.307 log point (0.691-0.384) for the
1971-75 cohort of traditional immigrants from 1981 to 2006, while the decline of the earn-
ings difference for native workers is 0.371 log point (0.643-0.272) over the same period. It
suggests that traditional immigrants seem to gain a comparative earnings advantage with
the accumulation of YSM over time, relative to the native-born. However, non-traditional
immigrants experience a monotonic and rapid decrease in the earnings difference over time.
For instance, the earnings difference for the 1971-75 cohort of non-traditional immigrants
decreases is 0.582 log point (0.712-0.130) over 25 years. It indicates that non-traditional
immigrants face a slower increase in self-employed earnings relative to paid earnings than
their native counterparts as YSM adds.
In general, self-employed workers report lower earnings than paid employees as they
report self-employed earnings net of costs. Some of these cost deductions may include a
room in a house and transportation costs, which would have been incurred regardless of
whether the individual was self-employed or not. In such cases, 1 dollar of self-employed
earnings would be superior to 1 dollar of paid earnings. Therefore, it is not surprising
that all predicted earnings difference (DDM and DDN) are negative for both immigrants
and the native-born. As a result, I focus on the earnings difference of immigrants relative
to the earnings difference of the native-born (DDM -DDN), which excludes the common
effect of underestimated self-employed earnings. In addition, the difference on the poten-
tial earnings differentials among immigrants and the native-born (DDM -DDN) eliminates
time effects since time effects are measured by the estimates of year dummies contained
in the earnings equation, which are constant for immigrants and the native-born. Conse-
quently, the difference between DDM and DDN are determined by the estimates of the
the zero value of YSM, while immigrants accumulate YSM over time, that is equal to sample means of
YSM for a certain cohort at a given year.
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cohort dummies (traditional or non-traditional cohorts), YSM (and its square) and their
interaction terms.
The levels of the relative potential earnings difference and their tendency over time are
two ways that potential earnings difference (relative to the native-born) can affect immi-
grant choice of becoming self-employed. The results reported in the lower panel of Table 2.4
show that non-traditional immigrants start with a strong comparative earnings advantage
over traditional immigrants, relative to the native-born, in the self-employment sector when
they first come to Canada in that their relative earnings difference (DDM -DDN) is posi-
tive and even remains so for a while. For example, the 1976-80 cohort of non-traditional
immigrants has the biggest relative earnings advantage at 0.238 in 1981 and it remains
positive until 2001. This indicates that the 1976-80 cohort of non-traditional immigrants
who are self-employed earns, on average, 0.238 more than similarly-aged paid employees
when they have resided in Canada for less than 5 years and they keep a comparative
earnings advantage in the self-employment sector for some time, although the levels of the
earnings advantage reduce over time. The non-traditional immigrants’ earnings advantage
relative to the native-born suggest that earlier cohorts of non-traditional immigrants who
arrived between 1971 to 1995 may have higher likelihood of self-employment than the na-
tive counterparts upon entry, and subsequently, they continue to exhibit higher levels of
self-employment rates than natives until the earnings advantage disappears.
In contrast, all cohorts of traditional immigrants start with negative values of earnings
differences upon entry, relative to the native-born, and maintain the earnings disadvantage
in the years after arrival. For instance, the 1976-80 cohort of traditional immigrants has a
relative earnings disadvantage of -0.135 in 1981, indicating that self-employed workers in
this cohort earn 0.135 less than paid employees at entry, relative to the native-born. This
pattern suggests that traditional immigrants have lower likelihood of self-employment than
the native workers upon entry and the lower self-employment rates last after their arrival
in Canada.
In summary, relative to native-born workers, the non-traditional immigrants experience
a lower average potential wage “penalty” from working in the self-employment sector while
traditional immigrants experience a larger one. As a result, non-traditional immigrants,
in particular of earlier cohorts, have higher self-employment rates than the native-born at
entry, while the traditional immigrants are expected to have relatively low self-employment
rates. Given that traditional immigrants dominate the non-traditional immigrants in the
population observed in earlier cohorts, these findings may explain why immigrants who
arrived between 1971 and 1990 have lower entry self-employment rates, relative to the
native-born and remain them negative for certain years. (See Figure 2.3 for details).
Subsequently, I investigate the trends of the relative earnings difference over time. Ta-
ble 2.4 shows that both groups of immigrants experience a decline in the gap relative to
the natives with the accumulation of YSM. However, this pattern have distinct influences
52
on the choice of being self-employed for traditional and non-traditional immigrants. As
non-traditional immigrants spend more years in Canada, they lose their earnings advan-
tage relative to native-born while the traditional immigrants seem to gain a comparative
earnings advantage with gains of YSM.
Specifically, the 1976-80 cohort of non-traditional immigrants has an earnings advantage
at 0.238 and 0.183 in 1981 and 1986, respectively. Then the earnings premium is narrowed
to 0.038 during the next 15-year period in Canada and it eventually becomes an earnings
disadvantage after 30 years since migration. Similarly, the other example of an earlier
cohort of non-traditional immigrants, who arrived in Canada from 1981 to 1985, clearly
mimics the reduction of the potential earnings advantage over time. They begin with an
earnings premium at 0.142 upon entry, but it ultimately turns into an disadvantage in the
self-employment sector, where non-traditional immigrants earn 0.073 less than observably-
identical paid employees after 20 years since migration. This tendency also applies to
recent cohorts of non-traditional immigrants. For instance, the relative earnings difference
decreases from -0.049 (in 2001) to -0.125 (in 2006) for the 1996-00 cohort. This pattern
indicates that non-traditional immigrants experience slower earnings growth in the self-
employment sector compared with the paid employment sector. This finding, however,
cannot explain the previously observed assimilation effect that non-traditional immigrants
are more likely to become self-employed in the years following migration, as shown in Table
2.2.
Conversely, by following each cohort of traditional immigrants, I find that the relative
earnings disadvantage decreases when they remain living in Canada. For example, the
1976-80 cohort of traditional immigrants has a relative earnings disadvantage of -0.135 in
1981 at entry and then the relative earnings difference declines to -0.097 with additional
five years spent in Canada. By 2006, self-employed workers in this cohort earn only 0.029
less than those with paid jobs. These results also display that the relative gap of earnings
difference between two sectors reduces from -0.182 to -0.079 when 1981-85 cohort of tradi-
tional immigrants lives another 20 years in Canada. This trend is also reflected by recent
cohorts of traditional immigrants. Of the traditional immigrants who arrived in Canada
between 1996 and 2000, self-employed men earn 0.222 less than paid employees in their first
five years in Canada. In the following five years, the relative earnings difference drops to
0.179. This tendency of narrowing earnings disadvantage over time implies that traditional
immigrants experience more rapid growth of self-employed earnings, which gives rise to an
earnings advantage in the self-employment sector and, in turn, explains why traditional
immigrants are more likely to become self-employed with gains of YSM. This outcome is
consistent with the positive and significant estimate of YSM for traditional immigrants, as
reported in Table 2.1.
When examining the earnings differences across cohorts, I find that the diagonal num-
bers become more negative for both categories of immigrants. These values represent
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the earnings difference, relative to natives upon their entry in Canada. For instance, the
1976-80 cohort of traditional immigrants has an earnings disadvantage at -0.135, while the
1981-85 cohort faces a bigger gap at -0.182. The earnings disadvantage at entry for the
next three successive cohorts are -0.172, -0.206, and -0.222, respectively. The most recent
2001-05 cohort even obtains a substantial negative gap of -0.440, which may be skewed
by a comparatively small sample size as fewer recent immigrants come from the tradi-
tional source regions during that period. Similarly, for non-traditional immigrants, new
immigrants of the 1976-80 cohort have an earnings advantage of 0.238, while the 1981-85
cohort almost has a half of the earnings premium of the 1976-80 cohort (0.142). The entry
earnings advantages continuously decline across the subsequent four cohorts. Overall, the
pattern of larger negative gaps suggests that new immigrants are experiencing the inferior
entry earnings in the self-employment sector relative to the paid employment sector, which
can not explain the tendency that recent cohorts of immigrants are more likely to turn to
self-employment than previous cohorts.
The final concern of this study is to examine the impact of the earnings difference on the
choice of self-employment through the structural probit model. The estimation results are
shown in Table 2.5. Five specifications of the structural probit model are used to give more
insights on the impact caused by earnings difference. The first specification includes only
the predicted earnings difference between the two sectors (dd). The significantly positive
estimate of this variable suggests that the probability of being self-employed increases when
expected self-employed earnings is higher than paid earnings. Meanwhile, the estimates of
YSM and its square, for traditional immigrants, are insignificant. This is the key result in
this chapter: the outcome emphasizes that traditional immigrants do not typically choose
self-employment in the years after arrival once the earnings advantage in self-employment
sector is controlled for. This finding further implies that traditional immigrants are at-
tracted to the self-employment sector because of the earnings advantage. Nonetheless,
for the non-traditional immigrants, their higher propensity for self-employment with more
years since migration does not disappear after controlling for the earnings difference in
consideration of the significant and positive estimate of YSM. This is a reasonable result
given that non-traditional immigrants lose their advantage relative to native-born with the
accumulation of YSM.
The second and third specifications supplement the first specification. The second adds
one more variable, which is the interaction term between earnings difference and immigrant
dummy variable; its estimate shows that the earnings advantage is more influential in the
immigrant decision to choose self-employment. Further, the third specification includes
another variable, which is the interaction term between earnings difference and years since
migration. It suggests that the earning advantage not only has more influence on immi-
grants, but also its impact becomes stronger in the years following migration to Canada.
Finally, another two specifications of structural probit model are also estimated. These
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distinguish traditional immigrants from non-traditional immigrants so as to examine spe-
cific impacts of earnings difference on each group of immigrants. Generally speaking, the
earnings advantage has more attraction to non-traditional immigrants than to traditional
immigrants, and the earnings advantage almost plays the same role in determining the
choice of self-employment in the years after migration for both categories of immigrants.
2.5.4 Discussion
My findings have shown that both traditional and non-traditional immigrant groups have a
high propensity for choosing self-employment, both upon entry and in the years subsequent
to arrival. A comparative earnings advantage, which grows within cohort of immigrants,
explains the tendency of increasing self-employment rates over time in traditional immi-
grant population. However, the reduction of a potential earnings advantage over time
cannot explain the tendency of increasing likelihood of self-employment over time among
non-traditional immigrant population. Moreover, the absence of an earnings advantage
cannot account for new immigrants’ higher propensity for self-employment relative to the
native-born and previous cohorts of immigrants. This suggests that there are factors other
than the earnings advantage that lead more recent immigrants to enter self-employment
sector.
Why are non-traditional immigrants more likely to turn to self-employment when they
are losing an earnings advantage over time? Why do recent cohorts of immigrants choose
self-employment in the absence of an earnings advantage? One explanation is that im-
migrants have difficulties to find a paid job, particularly a decently paid job. Wong and
Ng (2002) argued that the disadvantages faced by immigrants in the paid employment
sector force them to choose the self-employment sector. Especially in Canada, a great
proportion of recent immigrants comes from the non-traditional source regions, who lack
language capacity, recognized work experience and educational credentials. This hypoth-
esis is supported to some extent by findings in the first chapter. In Figure 1.3 shown in
the first chapter, we plot the age profiles for transitions, showing the predicted transition
probabilities among different labour force status across age and years of migration.
Beginning with the transition probabilities from unemployment to a paid job, the first
two panels in the fourth column present the transitions from unemployment to high-wage
and low-wage jobs, respectively. Specifically, the biggest gap of the transition probability
from unemployment to high-wage jobs (UtHt+1) occurs at the age of 25, when immigrants
are assumed to have arrived in Canada. Although the probability to find high-wage jobs
gradually increases over time, immigrants, on average, have comparatively lower transition
rates into high-wage jobs and it takes around 27 years for immigrants to catch up with
their native counterparts. This result demonstrates that it is extremely difficult for new
55
immigrants to find a high-wage job, even with accumulated work experience and skills in
the host country.
Furthermore, the transition from unemployment to low-wage jobs (UtLt+1) shows that
immigrants begin with similar opportunities to find low-wage jobs upon arrival in Canada,
and then this transition probability declines with more years since migration. I think
recent immigrants tend to resist taking in the low-wage employment sector, even when
such employment is not difficult to gain upon entry. When immigrants arrive in Canada,
they must often use the low-wage jobs as a stepping stone since high-wage jobs are difficult
to secure. With increased years since migration, immigrants still find little opportunity to
get a high-wage job, and by then, many of them have left low-wage jobs. In these instances,
the only option is to resort self-employment.
The transitions to self-employment from unemployment (UtSt+1) or low-wage jobs
(LtSt+1) provide some evidence of this explanation as well. Both transition probabili-
ties display a similar pattern where immigrants experience lower transition probabilities
upon migration to Canada and subsequently tend to have higher transition rates into self-
employment with more years since migration, eventually surpassing the native-born. Their
relatively low transition probabilities upon entry may be caused by the lack of money and
difficulties to obtain a loan. As a result, it is hard for them to establish a business just
after arrival. However, with the establishment of credit histories and the accumulation
of wealth, immigrants are more likely to become self-employed in the years subsequent to
migration.
Subsequently, I employ the Canadian Census data to test this hypothesis that im-
migrant higher likelihood of self-employment is caused by barriers to accessing paid-
employment. The sample used in the previous analysis in this chapter is restricted to
male workers who work for a full-year and full-time basis in the reference calendar year.
As a result, the variation in log weekly earnings is driven primarily by differences in hourly
wages, rather than differences in hours of work. In examining a possible comparative ad-
vantage (or productivity advantage) or a potential earnings difference between two sectors
are exactly what we want to focus on. But, it may be that the advantage of self-employment
for non-traditional immigrants lies in relative barriers to entering paid-employment sector.
In such cases, part-time or part-year workers are included in the sample to obtain a sub-
stantial variation in hours of work, and thereby to estimate the effect of easier accessing
self-employment. Accordingly, I relax the sample restriction and generate a complete sam-
ple which contains all observations with positive earnings in at least one of the two sectors.
I follow the same approach and predict the difference of the log annually earnings between
two sectors for the complete sample, as shown in Table 2.6.
The levels of the predicted earnings difference for both groups of immigrants are en-
hanced when I don’t restrict the analysis to full-year full-time workers. In particular,
non-traditional immigrants have more increase in the magnitudes of predicted earnings
56
difference. For example, the predicted relative earnings difference between two sectors for
the 1976-80 cohort of non-traditional immigrants is 0.427 in 1981, compared to 0.238 as
shown in Table 2.4. These results make sense, since more paid employees working on a
part-time and part-year basis are observed in the complete sample and they earn less than
full-time paid employees. Therefore, the predicted earnings differences between two sec-
tors tend to rise due to the decline in the average paid earnings observed in the complete
sample. I am particularly interested in the earnings difference for the most two recent
cohorts of non-traditional immigrants. They have the earnings differences in the log an-
nually earnings between two sectors upon entry are 0.083 and 0.023, respectively. The
positive levels of relative earnings differences indicate that new non-traditional immigrants
earn more in the self-employment sector by working more hours in this sector than in
the paid employment sector, and thus the higher level of self-employed earnings attract
them to self-employment at entry relative to the natives. It provides some evidence that
new immigrants who arrived in Canada between 1996 and 2005 have higher propensity for
self-employment than the native-born in levels, given that most immigrants come from the
non-traditional source countries in that period.
Nonetheless, the tendency on the difference of the log annually earnings between two
sectors does not change for non-traditional immigrants. Specifically, the predicted relative
earnings difference narrows with gains of YSM, suggesting that non-traditional immigrants
earn less in the self-employment sector relative to the paid employment sector over time. In
addition, the numbers in the diagonal are becoming smaller across arrival cohorts. This pat-
tern suggests that new immigrants from non-traditional source countries experience slower
increase of self-employed earnings compared to previous cohorts, even if self-employment
allows them to work as many hours as they like in this sector. Consequently, these re-
sults do not support the hypothesis that non-traditional immigrant higher likelihood of
self-employment contributes to the higher self-employed earnings by working more hours.
Another answer to these questions on immigrant higher propensity for self-employment
in the reduction or absence of an earnings advantage may lie in the culture related to
the country of origins or non-monetary benefits of self-employment. Several papers point
out that the culture and demographics of source countries influence the choice for self-
employment. Rafiq (1992) argued that culture determines the attitudes of individuals
toward entrepreneurship and certain cultural institutions may facilitate entry into en-
trepreneurship. Therefore, certain immigrant groups look favourably upon self-employment
and a higher self-employment rate is observed in the source country. The self-employment
rate in the source country is computed as the percentage of self-employed in the total
labour force in the country of origin. This information is obtained from the International
Labour Office (ILO) and refers to the year of 2007. Most countries in Asia have relatively
high self-employment rates. For instance, the self-employment rate in Korea is 29% and
Iran has a self-employment rate at 36%. Indonesia, Lebanon, Philippines, Sri Lanka and
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Thailand all exhibit a self-employment rate above 30%. China and Japan have relatively
low self-employment rates in Asia, which are 11% and 12%, respectively. In contrast, the
United States and the United Kingdom, two main traditional source regions, have self-
employment rates of 8% and 16.4%. In addition, the self-employment rate in Germany,
Italy and France is 12.9%, 25.6% and 12.7%, respectively. These figures6 suggest that indi-
viduals in non-traditional source regions may have preference to enter the self-employment
sector, which may positively affect their likelihood of self-employment while residing in
Canada.
Given that self-employment can provide independence and freedom, some individuals
specifically opt to “be their own boss”. Immigrants possibly derive more utilities from
working for themselves than working for others. This hypothesis may be strengthened by
the transition from high-wage to self-employed jobs (HtSt+1) which is displayed in the first
panel, third row of Figure 1.3. It illustrates that transition probability from high-wage jobs
to self-employment (HtSt+1) for immigrants originated from a higher level, and further, it
tends to diverge from that of the native-born with more years subsequent to migration.
In other words, immigrants who already find high-wage jobs are more inclined to be self-
employed when they have been residing in Canada. These elite may have accumulated
substantial wealth and established interpersonal communications, which are valuable assets
for starting a business. There is no doubt that not all immigrants hold the higher earnings
of self-employment as the first priority. Instead, some immigrants may be indifferent
to earnings and attach more importance to independence since they do not only value
outcomes, but also the conditions leading to these outcomes. A proportion of immigrants
thus sacrifice part of their earnings potential for emotional well-being. As a result, we can
observe a higher propensity for self-employment without expected increase of self-employed
earnings relative to paid earnings.
Some may argue to the contrary, that the high transition probability from high-wage
jobs to self-employment (HtSt+1) is caused by the difficulties to keep the high-wage job. The
actual cause remains unclear. However, if this argument is true, it will further reinforce my
first answer that immigrants have difficulties finding high-wage jobs. These explanations
suggest that immigrants not only encounter barriers to high-wage jobs, but also have
difficulties holding their job even if they are lucky to have gained high-wage jobs. Under
these circumstance, self-employment is the “option of last resort” for immigrants as they
have no other choice but to work for themselves.
6These statistics are not measured in a consistent way across countries and therefore should be inter-




This study is the first in the Canadian literature to examine the impact of an earnings
advantage on immigrant propensity for self-employment. This paper contributes to the past
findings by examining the dynamics of the self-employment versus the paid-employment
with an updated dataset and by analyzing relative immigrant earnings outcomes across
sectors instead of within sector with the control for the selectivity. Further, it examines
the extent to which the potential earnings difference between the self- and paid-employment
sectors can explain the increasing tendency toward self-employment observed in Canada.
Pooling Canadian Census Public Use Microdata Files (PUMFs) between 1981 and
2006, I find that Canada’s recent immigrants, who arrived between 1991 to 2005, have
higher self-employment rates than observably-identical Canadian-born workers. In con-
trast, immigrants that arrived prior to 1991 have lower self-employment rates than the
native counterparts upon entry. In addition, immigrant likelihood of self-employment tend
to rise as immigrants have been residing in Canada. The results also suggest that the
predicted earnings difference between the self- and the paid-employment sectors positively
affect immigrants’ self-employment rates. Moreover, I find the difference in the patterns of
potential earnings difference among traditional and non-traditional immigrants. As tradi-
tional immigrants experience a more rapid growth of self-employed earnings relative to the
paid earnings with time since migration, the earnings premium in the self-employment sec-
tor can explain their tendency of increasing propensity for the self-employment over time.
Once this earnings premium is controlled for, the self-employment rates do not tend to grow
with gains of YSM in the traditional immigrant population. However, non-traditional im-
migrants experience the reduction of an earnings advantage in the self-employment sector
over time, which can not account for their increasing likelihood of self-employment with
the accumulation of YSM. There is some evidence that immigrants, in particular of non-
traditional immigrants, have difficulties accessing paid-employment. Finally, the culture
related to religion and non-monetary benefits provided by self-employment such as inde-
pendence and freedom may attract immigrants to self-employment as well.
In the discussion section, I illustrate the rates of self-employment in several source
countries, but these figures are measured in a inconsistent way across countries. In my
future research, I will carefully explore self-employment rates in the source countries with
better information and then investigate if the self-employment rates are more prominent
in Asia and Africa relative to the U.S., the U.K., Europe, Caribbean and Oceania. In
particular, I will examine differences in trends of the self-employment rates over time
across these sets of countries and whether differences in tendency affect the propensities
for self-employment in the host country for two types of immigrants. In addition, I mention
that ethnic enclaves can provide a comparative advantage by concentrating in a particular
geographic location. Further, I would like to measure the concentration of immigrants
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from the same source country in the self-employment sector, and hence I can estimate the
extent to which an immigrant choice of self-employment is influenced by the measure of
concentration. In other words, I will explore whether a greater proportion of immigrants
from the same source country who are already self-employed in a specific region affects the
likelihood of becoming self-employed of an individual who migrated from the same source
country and currently resides in the same region in Canada.
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Age 42.049* 40.201* 39.148 
No high school 0.232* 0.185* 0.222 
High school 0.159* 0.187* 0.223 
College or trade certificate 0.354* 0.252* 0.337 
University diploma below bachelor 0.027* 0.048* 0.024 
Bachelor’s degree  0.114* 0.187* 0.129 
University diploma above bachelor 0.024* 0.027* 0.019 
Graduate degree 0.089* 0.111* 0.048 
Married 0.823* 0.826* 0.697 
Number of children 1.435* 1.491* 1.238 
The presence of a child 0.710* 0.727* 0.629 
The wife’s total income 20,861* 19,545* 18,124 
Log of wife’s total income 6.882* 6.950*  6.437 
Toronto 0.326* 0.463*  0.105 
Vancouver 0.088* 0.141*  0.051 
Calgary 0.038* 0.045*  0.035 
Montreal 0.112 0.118  0.121 
Atlantic provinces 0.007* 0.003*  0.068 
Quebec (outside Montreal)  0.020* 0.009*  0.156 
Ontario (outside Toronto) 0.257* 0.113*  0.249 
Manitoba 0.026* 0.029*  0.041 
Saskatchewan 0.010* 0.007*  0.037 
Albert (outside Calgary) 0.055* 0.048*  0.076 
British Columbia (outside Vancouver) 0.061 0.023*  0.060 
Primary Industry 0.034* 0.015*  0.062 
Manufacturing 0.253* 0.285*  0.209 
Construction 0.103* 0.044*  0.072 
Transportation 0.056* 0.063*  0.073 
Communication and utilities 0.036* 0.035*  0.053 
Wholesale trade 0.060* 0.066*  0.071 
Retail trade 0.081* 0.097*  0.092 
Finance, insurance and real estate 0.049 0.060*  0.047 
Educational services 0.063* 0.034*  0.054 
Health and social services 0.032* 0.043*  0.036 
Business services 0.085* 0.101*  0.071 
Government services 0.056* 0.039*  0.100 
Accommodation, food and beverage  0.037* 0.068*  0.019 


















Log weekly earnings 6.833* 6.606*  6.790 
Log weekly earning in SE sector 6.420* 6.277*  6.386 
Log weekly paid earning in paid sector 6.876* 6.637*  6.826 
Earnings difference between two sectors -0.456 -0.360  -0.440 
Share (%) 9.21 9.66  81.14 
Number of observations 49,189 51,578  433,435 
S.E. rate 0.094* 0.086*  0.079 
Employment rate* 0.930 0.866*  0.925 
Note: The sample consists of men between 25 to 54 years of age who worked on a full- time 
and full-year basis. Traditional immigrants migrant from Canada's traditional immigrant source 
regions – the U.S., U.K., Europe, Caribbean and Oceania; Non-traditional immigrants come 
from non-traditional source regions -- Asia and Africa. The earnings difference between two 
sectors is the difference of the means of the log weekly earnings between the self-employment 
and paid-employment sectors. * indicates traditional (non-traditional) immigrants are 






























Table 2.2: Reduced-form binary probit model.
Variable    Coefficients Marginal probabilities 
Age  0.059*** (0.004) 0.006(0.0004) 
Age^2/100  -0.063*** (0.005) -0.006***(0.0005) 
Married    0.008(0.007) 0.0008(0.001) 
The presence of child  -0.061*** (0.004) -0.008***(0.001) 
Number of children  0.035*** (0.003) 0.008***(0.004) 
Log of wife’s total income  0.037*** (0.001) 0.001***(0.00001) 
Traditional cohort effect    
  Traditional immigrant dummy  -0.119 (0.241) -0.005(0.025) 
  1971-75   0.012 (0.025) 0.001(0.003) 
  1976-80   0.027 (0.031) 0.005(0.004) 
  1981-85   0.145*** (0.040) 0.016***(0.006) 
  1986-90   0.121*** (0.043) 0.016***(0.006) 
  1991-95   0.127*** (0.048) 0.025***(0.008) 
  1996-00   0.167 ***(0.055) 0.027***(0.009) 
  2001-05   0.250*** (0.069) 0.042***(0.012) 
Non-traditional cohort effect    
  Non-traditional immigrant dummy  -0.003(0.235) 0.008(0.029) 
  1971-75   0.001 (0.030) 0.001(0.003) 
  1976-80   0.063 (0.032) 0.010***(0.004) 
  1981-85   0.111 **(0.031) 0.018***(0.005) 
  1986-90   0.188*** (0.034) 0.026***(0.005) 
  1991-95   0.249 ***(0.036) 0.041***(0.007) 
  1996-00   0.272*** (0.043) 0.049***(0.008) 
  2001-05   0.302*** (0.050) 0.051***(0.010) 
Traditional immigrant interaction    
  Age  -0.005 (0.012) -0.001(0.001) 
  Age^2/100  0.004 (0.014) 0.001(0.002) 
  YSM  0.015*** (0.003) 0.001***(0.0004) 
  YSM^2/100  -0.021*** (0.006) -0.002***(0.0006) 
Non-traditional immigrant interaction    
  Age  -0.025** (0.012) -0.002*(0.001) 
  Age^2/100  0.029** (0.014) 0.003*(0.001) 
  YSM  0.040*** (0.003) 0.003***(0.0003) 
  YSM^2/100  -0.068*** (0.008) -0.006***(0.001) 
Constant  -2.363***(0.074)  
Number of observations            534,206  
Note: The dependent variable is binary, equaling to 1 if self-employed and 0 if a paid-employed. 
Independent variables include educational credentials, industry, geography and year dummies. 
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; and *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.3: Earnings Equations in both the self- and the paid-employment sectors.
Variable  Self-employment        Paid employment 
Age  0.074*** (0.007) 0.073 ***(0.001) 
Age^2/100  -0.083*** (0.008) -0.075 ***(0.002) 
Married  0.169*** (0.011) 0.146*** (0.002) 
Traditional cohort effect    
Non-traditional immigrant dummy   0.075(0.447) -0.004 (0.084) 
  1971-75   -0.053 (0.044) 0.023** (0.009) 
  1976-80   -0.010 (0.054) 0.052*** (0.011) 
  1981-85   -0.002 (0.070) 0.080*** (0.015) 
  1986-90   -0.040 (0.073) 0.037** (0.016) 
  1991-95   -0.104 (0.082) 0.005 (0.018) 
  1996-00   -0.197** (0.096) -0.080*** (0.021) 
  2001-05   -0.418*** (0.116) -0.230***(0.018) 
Non-traditional cohort effect    
Non-traditional immigrant dummy   1.246*** (0.438) 0.232*** (0.080) 
  1971-75   -0.123 **(0.053) -0.067*** (0.011) 
  1976-80   -0.086 (0.057) -0.086*** (0.011) 
  1981-85   -0.188*** (0.061) -0.099*** (0.012) 
  1986-90   -0.237 ***(0.061) -0.114*** (0.012) 
  1991-95   -0.332 ***(0.065) -0.158*** (0.013) 
  1996-00   -0.386 ***(0.077) -0.138*** (0.016) 
  2001-05   -0.536*** (0.092) -0.230*** (0.018) 
Traditional immigrant interaction    
  Age  -0.017 (0.022) -0.009**(0.004) 
  Age^2/100  0.013 (0.026) 0.008 (0.005) 
  YSM  0.023*** (0.006) 0.010*** (0.001) 
  YSM^2/100  -0.032*** (0.011) -0.009*** (0.002) 
Non-traditional immigrant interaction    
  Age  -0.070 ***(0.022) -0.029***(0.004) 
  Age^2/100  0.073*** (0.026) 0.025*** (0.005) 
  YSM  0.025*** (0.006) 0.031*** (0.001) 
  YSM^2/100  -0.045*** (0.015) -0.045*** (0.003) 
Constant  4.361*** (0.143) 5.369*** (0.024) 
Number of observations     44,347         489,859 
Rho  0.448 (0.015) 0.868 (0.001) 
Note: The dependent variable is log weekly earnings and standard errors are in parentheses. 
Independent variables include educational credentials, industry, geography and year dummies. 
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; and *** 







Table 2.4: Difference in the predicted log weekly earnings between two sectors across arrival
cohorts and years .
 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 
DDM 
Traditional Immigrant cohort 
71-75 -0.384 -0.464                    -0.420 -0.517 -0.471 -0.691 
76-80 -0.408                           -0.482 -0.429 -0.518 -0.463 -0.672 
81-85  -0.566                     -0.506 -0.585 - 0.523 -0.722 
86-90   -0.536               -0.609 -0.536 -0.724 
91-95    -0.679            -0.600 -0.776 
96-00     -0.653       -0.822 
01-05      -1.083 
Non-traditional immigrant cohort     
71-75 -0.130 -0.299 -0.324 -0.476 -0.468 -0.712 
76-80 -0.035 -0.202 -0.234 -0.393 -0.393 -0.647 
81-85  -0.242 -0.280 -0.447 -0.453 -0.716 
86-90   -0.264 -0.437 -0.452 -0.722 
91-95    -0.446 -0.465 -0.746 
96-00     -0.480 -0.768 
01-05      -0.768 
DDN 
Natives -0.272         -0.385 -0.364 -0.473 -0.431 -0.643 
DDM-DDN 
Traditional Immigrant cohort 
71-75 -0.112 -0.079 -0.056 -0.043 -0.040 -0.048 
76-80 -0.135 -0.097 -0.066 -0.044 -0.032 -0.029 
81-85  -0.182 -0.142 -0.112 -0.093 -0.079 
86-90   -0.172 -0.135 -0.105 -0.081 
91-95    -0.206 -0.169 -0.134 
96-00     -0.222 -0.179 
01-05      -0.440 
Non-traditional Immigrant cohort 
71-75 0.143 0.085 0.039 -0.003 -0.037 -0.070 
76-80 0.238 0.183 0.130 0.081 0.038 -0.004 
81-85  0.142 0.084 0.026 -0.022 -0.073 
86-90   0.099 0.036 -0.021 -0.079 
91-95    0.027 -0.034 -0.103 
96-00     -0.049 -0.125 
01-05      -0.126 
Note: DDM is the predicted earnings difference between the self- and the paid-employment 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.6: Difference in the predicted log annually earnings between two sectors across
arrival cohorts and years, for the complete sample .
 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 
       DDM-DDN 
Traditional Immigrant cohort 
71-75 -0.100 -0.073 -0.057 -0.052 -0.058 -0.078 
76-80 -0.126 -0.090 -0.065 -0.051 -0.047 -0.055 
81-85  -0.132 -0.097 -0.079 -0.060 -0.054 
86-90   -0.070 -0.040 -0.175 -0.002 
91-95    -0.187 -0.157 -0.132 
96-00     -0.225 -0.189 
01-05      -0.366 
Non-traditional Immigrant cohort 
71-75 0.249 0.135 0.054 -0.008 -0.045 -0.057 
76-80 0.427 0.291 0.181 0.094 0.033 -0.008 
81-85  0.375 0.229 0.113 0.029 -0.041 
86-90   0.299 0.145 0.029 -0.069 
91-95    0.192 0.048 -0.082 
96-00     0.083 -0.099 
01-05       0.023 
Note: The complete sample includes all male workers who have positive earnings in at least  




Figure 2.1: Business immigration to Canada: 1980-2006.
 
 
 Note: These figures are derived from published numbers in Employment and Immigration Canada,  
 “Immigration Statistics” Cat. No. mp 22-1 (various years) and Citizenship and Immigration Canada  
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Chapter 3
The Influence of Measurement Error
and Unobserved Heterogeneity in
Estimating Immigrant Returns to
Foreign and Host-Country Sources of
Human Capital
3.1 Introduction
In the textbook model of immigrant wage assimilation immigrants experience wage dis-
parities on arrival in a host country, relative to similarly aged and educated native-born
workers, but with time since migration the gaps close. In his seminal study of immigrant
earnings, Chiswick (1978) argued that this pattern arises from discounting by host-country
employers of foreign sources of human capital combined with immigrant accumulation of
host-country-specific knowledge and skills following migration. To capture these ideas em-
pirically, Chiswick began by positing a process generating wage outcomes for immigrants
with separate returns to foreign and host-country sources of training, though this is not
what he estimated. Instead, he imposed parameter restrictions on the data generating pro-
cess (DGP) he had in mind, which amounted to allowing an intercept shift for immigrants
– to capture the discounting of their foreign human capital – and estimating a quadratic
return to an immigrant’s years since migration (YSM) – to capture the assimilation pro-
cess. This approach spawned a large literature, which has come to cover many countries
(see Borjas 1999 for a review).
From a policy perspective, however, direct evidence on the differential returns to foreign
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and host-country sources of human capital, provides a much richer set of insights than
does an overall return to YSM. For a country such as Canada, struggling to address a
deterioration in the labour market performance of more recent immigrant arrival cohorts
(Aydemir and Skuterud 2005), these insights are invaluable. For example, the potential
dependence of immigrant wages at entry and subsequent wage growth on the schooling
and work experience immigrants bring with them directly informs the criteria which the
government uses to select immigrants. Their decision in 2008, for example, to increase the
value of Canadian work experience in their selection criteria appears to have been, in large
part, motivated by growing evidence of a significant disparity between immigrant returns
to foreign and host-country work experience. Evidence on the relative wage returns to host-
country schooling and experience, on the other hand, informs the efficacy of alternative
immigrant settlement policies, such as Canada’s Enhanced Language Training programs
introduced in 2004 to provide occupation-specific language training to recent immigrants.
To directly estimate returns to foreign and host-country sources of schooling and ex-
perience we need measures of where immigrants’ years of schooling and work experience
were obtained. Unfortunately, the source country of schooling is typically unobserved in
available data sources, while work experience is nearly always measured as a residual given
a worker’s age and years of schooling. We are aware of no study using direct information on
the source country of immigrants’ work experience and four studies using direct information
on the source of schooling in the literature estimating separate foreign and host-country
human capital returns (Borjas 1982; Kossoudji 1989; Alboim, Finnie and Meng 2005; and
Ferrer, Green and Riddell 2006).1 However, in all four cases, the data come from single
cross-sectional surveys, so that they are unable to empirically distinguish the effects of
time-since-arrival from cohort effects. Instead, studies estimating separate returns in a
complete assimilation model with cohort effects, which have burgeoned in Canada over
the past decade, have distinguished foreign from host-country sources by assuming all
schooling is strictly continuous from age 5 and one year of labour market experience is
accumulated in every year after schooling is complete (Stewart and Hyclak 1985; Friedberg
2000; Schaafsma and Sweetman 2001; Bratsberg and Ragan 2002; Green and Worswick
2002; Aydemir and Skuterud 2005, 2008; and Ferrer and Riddell 2008). But to the ex-
tent that immigrants with foreign work experience return to school or experience periods
of nonemployment following migration, this approach introduces measurement error, the
1We are also aware of three additional studies comparing host-country and foreign schooling returns
using direct information on the source of schooling, but in each case the analysis is narrower than the
average population returns of interest in our paper (Wiers-Jenssen and Try (2005) compare Norwegian
nationals studying abroad to Norwegians with host-country credentials; Clark and Jaeger (2006) compare
GED returns between U.S. immigrants and natives; and Hartog and Zorlu (2009) look at returns to foreign
education among Dutch refugees.) There is also a literature concerned with the determinants of post-
migration schooling that uses direct measures of host-country schooling (Chiswick and Miller 1994; Khan
1997; Hum and Simpson 2003; Cobb-Clark, Connolly and Worswick 2005; Van Tubergen and Werfhorst
2007).
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consequences of which are far from straightforward. Moreover, though never explicitly ac-
knowledged in the literature (to our knowledge), the key advantage of the YSM approach
to modeling immigrant wage outcomes (besides its limited data requirements) is that con-
ditional on arrival cohort, and ignoring compositional effects in pseudo-panel data due to
outmigration or age at migration effects, YSM is exogenous in the sense that it captures
an aging process that is not a choice variable. The decision of whether to begin accumulat-
ing work experience or host-country schooling following migration might, in contrast, be
highly correlated with immigrant wage levels or anticipated future wage growth, thereby
complicating inferences regarding wage assimilation. Just as the current literature has
tended to overlook the consequences of measurement error, we are aware of no attempt
in the literature estimating separate foreign/host-country returns to address the potential
endogeneity of the post-migration work/schooling decision.
Using a particularly rich Canadian data source – the Survey of Labour and Income
Dynamics (SLID) – which identifies the age of school completion and when full-time work
began, and is longitudinal allowing us to control for individual fixed effects, we examine to
what extent the results of the current literature may be driven by biases arising from mea-
surement error and the endogeneity of post-migration human capital investments. We are
particularly interested in the sensitivity of two key findings on which the current literature
is almost universally consistent: (i) essentially no return to foreign work experience; and
(ii) a modest advantage in the return to host-country over foreign schooling. Assuming
these findings have played some role in motivating recent changes in Canadian immigration
policy, which seems likely, we think this sensitivity analysis is needed.
Our main finding is that the estimates in the current literature by and large do not
appear to be driven by biases arising from either the assumptions necessary to distinguish
foreign from host-country human capital or from unobserved heterogeneity. Using our more
accurate measures of foreign and host-country human capital, we obtain somewhat larger,
and in some cases statistically significant, returns to foreign work experience, though they
remain substantially smaller than the returns to host-country experience for either immi-
grants or natives. Controlling for individual fixed effects in order to account for both the
possible endogeneity of schooling and work experience and errors in distinguishing the for-
eign and host-country quantities of these variables (since within-panel changes in schooling
and experience are necessarily host-country) does even less to influence the estimated re-
turns to foreign experience. As for education returns, we continue to find relatively modest
differences in immigrant returns to foreign and host-country schooling using our improved
measures. Furthermore, adding fixed effects, if anything, suggests even smaller advantages
of host-country over foreign schooling for immigrants.
An important advantage of estimating foreign and host-country returns is that entry
effects and subsequent wage growth depend directly on the stocks of foreign human capital
immigrants bring and their post-migration schooling and work decisions. Not only does this
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serve to control for age at migration, thereby overcoming a source of bias inherent in the
YSM approach, but it also offers a much richer set of counterfactual predictions to identify
what types of immigrants and post-migration behaviour produce better wage outcomes.
Consistent with results in Green and Worswick (2002) and Aydemir and Skuterud (2005),
after accounting for measurement errors and unobserved heterogeneity we continue to
find that immigrants with more foreign experience not only start at lower initial wages
(relative to a comparably aged native), but also experience lower subsequent wage growth.
In fact, controlling for individual fixed effect makes the latter result even stronger. In
contrast, we find little evidence that foreign schooling either lowers relative wage outcomes
at entry or affects subsequent wage growth. These results provide valuable insights to
inform immigrant selection and settlement policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section we briefly
make the case for the “separate returns model” over the more standard YSM approach to
modeling relative immigrant wage outcomes. We then consider the potential consequences
of measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity that arise in estimating separate re-
turns using standard data sources. In the fourth section we describe our data, our approach
to distinguishing foreign from host-country sources of schooling and experience, and the
specifications we estimate. Section 5 presents the results. We conclude by summarizing
our main findings.
3.2 The Missing Parameters Problem
We have argued above that estimating separate foreign and host-country returns offers poli-
cymakers a much richer set of policy inferences to guide immigrant selection and settlement
policy. In addition, by conditioning on years of foreign schooling and work experience the
model implicitly controls for age at migration, thereby overcoming a shortcoming implicit
in the standard YSM approach that predominates the literature. Notwithstanding these
advantages, however, in our view the more compelling reason for preferring the separate
returns model lies in the potential of the YSM model to produce misleading inferences re-
garding the capacity of immigrant wage outcomes to assimilate to those of their native-born
counterparts in a world with separate foreign and host-country returns.
To see the nature of the bias inherent in the YSM approach, assume for the sake of
simplicity that the true (latent) data generating process (DGP) determining wage outcomes
in the population of immigrants and natives is given by:
wi = α0 + α1exphi + α2expfi + εi (3.1)
where exphi and expfi are years of host-country and foreign experience, respectively; α1 >
α2; cov(exphi, expfi) < 0 in the immigrant population; and εi is some random influence.
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Do immigrants assimilate in this world? Since immigrants and natives share a constant
linear return to host-country experience, the answer is no. But consider what happens if we
estimate the basic YSM model found in Chiswick’s (1978) seminal paper, which ignoring
schooling returns (as well as any year or cohort effects) is simply given by:
wi = β0 + β1expi +mi · (β2 + β3ysmi) + ei (3.2)
where mi is an immigrant dummy variable; expi = exphi + expfi; ysmi = exphi; and
β3 > 0 is evidence of assimilation. Given the DGP in (3.1), it is straightforward to show
that the probability limit of estimated assimilation is:
plim β̂3 = (α1 − β̂1) +
(α2 − β̂1)cov(exphi, expfi)
var(exphi)
(3.3)
which is necessarily positive, implying discrimination when in fact there is none (see Ap-
pendix). Borjas (1999, p.1721) and Friedberg (2000, footnote 16) claim that the correct
interpretation of the positive return to YSM in estimating (3.2) is, holding total experi-
ence constant, immigrants with less of the foreign variety face a relative wage advantage.
The result in (3.3) reveals that the estimated YSM return, in fact, depends not just on
the relative advantage of host-country experience, but also on the correlation in the data
between host-country and foreign experience. Given a large enough positive correlation,
the estimated return could, in fact, imply dissimilation, even if host-country experience is
more valued.2 But since individuals (or at least their working careers) are finite lived, the
correlation will tend to be negative leading us to infer assimilation when in fact there is
no assimilation in the actual data.
The nature of the bias in (3.3) is essentially a missing parameters problem. This can
be overcome in this case by adding a separate experience return for immigrants, that is by
estimating the extended YSM model:
wi = β0 + β1expi +mi · (β2 + β3expi + β4ysmi) + ei. (3.4)
where now immigrants assimilate to natives if β3 + β4 > 0. Given the data come from the
DGP in (3.1), this produces β̂1 = α1; β̂3 = α2−α1; and β̂4 = α1−α2, which now correctly
implies no assimilation (since β̂3 + β̂4 = 0).
3 But estimated assimilation from this extended
YSM model is again potentially biased if the process determining wage outcomes in the
2The bias is a bit more complicated than equation (3.3) suggests since β̂1 itself depends on the sample
moments of the distribution. Setting α1 = 0.05; α2 = 0.01; m̄ = 0.2; exphi = 17; expf i = 6; var(exphi) =
64; and var(expfi) = 25 in a Monte Carlo simulation, β̂3 becomes positive as corr(exphi, expfi) > 0.1. All
of our analytical results in this section and the next have been confirmed by simulations. The programming
code for these are available upon request.
3To see this simply replace expi in (3.4) with exphi + expfi and ysmi with exphi.
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labour market also depends on unequal returns to host-country and foreign schooling. To
see this, suppose the DGP is given by:
wi = α0 + α1exphi + α2shi + α3expfi + α4sfi + εi (3.5)
where shi and sfi are host-country and foreign years of schooling respectively, and we
estimate:
wi = β0 + β1expi + β2si +mi · (β3 + β4expi + β5si + β6ysmi) + ei (3.6)
where now ysmi = exphi+shi. Again, immigrants do not assimilate in this DGP, since host-
country returns are linear and equal for immigrants and natives. But what does estimation
of (3.6) imply? It can be shown that in this case β̂6 is estimated as a weighted average
of the host-country (over foreign) advantage in work experience (α1 − α3) and schooling
(α2 − α4), where the weighting depends on the relative magnitudes of var(exphi + expfi)
and var(shi + sfi), as well as the covariances of exphi, shi, expfi, and sfi (see Appendix
B). What does this imply for estimates of assimilation? Suppose, for example, that the
advantage of host-country sources is larger in schooling than experience (α2−α4 > α1−α3)
and var(si) is large relative to var(expi). Then the estimate of β6 will tend to exceed the
estimate of β4 (in absolute value), implying assimilation relative to natives (assuming
the immigrant works following migration), when there is in fact no assimilation in the
underlying DGP. In real world data, however, the variance in experience tends to exceed
the variance in schooling, so that the estimated return to YSM will be weighted towards
the host-country advantage in experience. But because the model does not distinguish
whether the immigrant’s YSM are spent in work or school, the model’s estimates regarding
assimilation are potentially misleading.
Again the nature of the bias in the YSM model is essentially a missing parameters
problem, which can only be avoided by directly estimating separate host-country and
foreign returns to schooling and experience. In this respect, and because separate foreign
and host-country returns offer a much richer set of counterfactual predictions to inform
immigrant selection and settlement policy, the separate returns model is preferred to the
predominant YSM approach. But, of course, there are obstacles to estimating the separate
returns model using the standard data sources available, which presumably explains the
predominance of YSM models in the literature. In the following section we consider the
potential biases introduced in overcoming these obstacles.
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3.3 Potential Biases of the Separate Returns Model
3.3.1 Measurement error
The practical challenge in estimating separate foreign and host-country returns to schooling
and experience is these quantities are typically unobserved in available data sources. As
mentioned earlier, the approach taken in the current literature estimating separate returns
is to assume all schooling is strictly continuous from age 5 and one year of labour market
experience is accumulated in every year after schooling is completed . One need then
only observe three variables: (i) current age; (ii) age at immigration; and (iii) total years
of schooling, to uniquely distinguish schooling and experience obtained abroad from that
obtained in the host-country.
This set of assumptions introduces three forms of measurement error, the consequences
of which are far from straightforward. First, the assumption of strictly continuous schooling
implies an individual cannot hold both foreign labour market experience and host-country
schooling, that is expfi > 0 ⇒ shi = 0. To the extent that immigrants with foreign
work experience return to school after migrating, host-country schooling will be under
measured by exactly the same amount as foreign schooling is over measured. Furthermore,
foreign (host-country) potential experience will be over measured (under measured) by
that same amount. Second, temporary work permits and student visas make it possible for
immigrants to obtain host-country schooling or experience prior to obtaining permanent
residence status. The use of age at immigration (or the date that permanent residence
status was obtained) instead of age at migration (the date of arrival in the host-country)
will have a similar effect as assuming continuous schooling: host-country schooling (poten-
tial experience) will be under measured (over measured) by exactly the same amount that
foreign schooling (potential experience) is over measured (under measured). Third, poten-
tial experience may be a poor measure of actual labour market experience. The difference
is likely to be particularly important for immigrants whose migration decisions may be
motivated by nonemployment or who may experience periods of nonemployment following
migration.
Analytically it is difficult to say much about the nature of the biases arising from these
measurement errors. To the extent that the errors are correlated with the true values of
the observables or with unobservables, this is particularly the case. Assuming that the
measurement error that results from using potential instead of actual experience is purely
random, we know that the estimated experience returns will tend to be attenuated (note
that this does not depend on the mean of the measurement error being zero). To the extent
that this error affects foreign experience measures more than host-country experience, this
could account for the particularly low estimated returns to foreign experience.
The measurement error resulting from assuming strictly continuous schooling and using
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dates of immigration instead of dates of arrival is, however, more complex. Nonetheless, it
is worthwhile considering one especially simple case, which offers a useful insight. Assume





i + εi (3.7)
where all variables are now expressed as deviations from their means. It can then be
shown that using the observed values exphi and expfi, where exphi = exph
∗
i + ui; expfi =
expf ∗i − ui; ui ∼ iid[0, σ2u]; E(uiεi) = 0; and E(expj∗i εi) = 0 for jε[h, f ], gives:
plim β̂ = β − [Q∗ + Σuu]−1 Σuuβ (3.8)
where β = [β1, β2]





for jε[h, f ]; and Σuu = σ
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′, where e = [1,−1] (see Greene (2008), equation (12-16)).




























Hence, to the extent that the true returns to foreign and host-country experience are
identical (β1 = β2), the measurement error in distinguishing foreign from host-country
quantities has no effect on the consistency of the estimator (though it does reduce its
efficiency). In fact, this is true even if the measurement error is non-random. The intuition
is that the measurement error in the two variables simply cancels out in the error term.
Our expectation, however, is that the host-country return dominates (β1 > β2), in which
case (3.9) implies that the return to foreign (host-country) experience is unambiguously
overestimated (underestimated). Measurement error does not then appear responsible for
the low estimated returns to foreign experience in the literature. However, this is no longer
necessarily true if foreign and host-country experience are negatively correlated (q∗hf < 0),







sufficiently negative, the measurement error that results from assuming strictly continuous
schooling and dates of immigration can simultaneously produce downward biases in the
estimated returns to both foreign and host-country experience.4 The useful insight to take
from this, however, is that the consequences of measurement error in the separate returns
model may be negligible even if the measurement error is substantial.
3.3.2 Unobserved heterogeneity
It is widely recognized in the immigrant assimilation literature that non-random outmi-
gration contaminates estimated returns to YSM if immigrant entry cohorts are followed
4This is easiest to show using a Monte Carlo simulation. The programming code are available upon
request.
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across repeated cross-sections of data. There now exist a handful of studies using longitu-
dinal microdata to examine the sensitivity of estimated assimilation rates to compositional
changes in immigrant cohorts. Duleep and Regets (1997), Hu (2000), Duleep and Dowhan
(2002) and most recently Lubotsky (2007) examine U.S. survey data, in a number of cases
combined with Social Security records, while Edin, Lalonde and Åslund (2000) use Swedish
Census data matched with tax records, and Hum and Simpson (2004) use the same Cana-
dian longitudinal survey data examined in the present study. With the exception of the
papers by Duleep and coauthors, a consistent finding in these studies is substantially lower
immigrant wage growth when selective outmigration is accounted for. This is consistent
with a higher propensity of outmigration among workers with relatively low earnings (con-
ditional on observables).
To date, all the research using longitudinal data has inferred assimilation from estimated
returns to YSM.5 In directly estimating foreign and host-country returns, we introduce a
second channel through which unobserved worker heterogeneity can bias estimates. As
noted above, unlike YSM, which is necessarily exogenous (conditional on cohort and ignor-
ing any non-random sample attrition), particular post-migration schooling and experience
investments reflect choices made by immigrants (and employers) and are therefore poten-
tially correlated with unobservables. Inferring assimilation from an immigrant’s relative
return to host-country work experience would be problematic, for example, if immigrants’
propensity to accumulate host-country work experience is correlated with their unobserved
ability or career motivation. As a result, in estimating separate returns, it is even more
critical to in some way account for the unobservable heterogeneity of workers that may, in
part, determine wage outcomes. We are not aware of any attempt in the existing literature
to do so.
Just as distinguishing post-migration activities complicates the estimation of post-
migration wage growth, distinguishing immigrants by their stock of foreign schooling and
experience within entry cohorts, complicates the estimation of immigrant entry effects.
The reason is, again, that pre-migration human capital investments, or more generally the
age when immigrants migrate, reflect choices made by immigrants, and could conceivably
be correlated with unobservables. For example, it may be that as adults age their reasons
for migrating have increasingly less to do with personal career ambitions and more to do
with efforts to leave behind undesirable environments or to improve the lifetime welfare of
children. To the extent that these different motivations lead to different host-country wage
outcomes, estimated returns to foreign experience will tend to be biased (and underesti-
mated if career ambitions of migrants tend to decline with age at migration). Nonetheless,
5Two exceptions are Chiswick, Lee and Miller (2005) and Akresh (2007) in that they distinguish host-
country schooling and actual labour market experience. Their samples, however, contain no native-born
workers and immigrants are observed in the former case at arrival and 3.5 years later and in the latter
case one year following migration. As a result, their inferences regarding immigrants’ capacity to obtain
comparable wages to natives is severely limited.
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from the perspective of a policymaker deciding on the optimal immigrant selection criteria,
this is not the return of interest. Regardless of what the low return to foreign experience
captures, what matters to the policymaker determining selection criteria is the usefulness
of the observable signal in predicting success in the host-country’s labour markets. In
contrast, in estimating host-country returns what is important is whether influencing the
post-migration schooling and work activities of immigrants through settlement policies can
be expected to produce better outcomes. Fortunately, because host-country, but not for-
eign, quantities of schooling and experience are time-varying, controlling for unobserved
fixed effects is feasible in the estimation of the host-country, but not foreign, returns.
3.4 Methods
3.4.1 The Separate Returns Model
To our knowledge, Stewart and Hyclak (1985) and Kossoudji (1989) are the first studies
to estimate a separate returns model of immigrant earnings. Although both papers use
a single cross-section of data, subsequent papers have estimated separate returns using
repeated cross-sections. In this case, the model can be written:
wit = yt + fx(exphit) + fs(shit) +mi · [cohorti + gxf (expfit) +
gxh(exphit) + gxhf (expfit · exphit) + gsf (sfit) + gsh(shit)] + eit (3.10)
where wit is the log hourly wage of worker i observed in year t; yt is a vector of year
dummies; expfi and exphi are years of foreign and host-country labour market experience
respectively; sfit and shit are years of foreign and host-country schooling respectively; mi
is an immigrant dummy; cohorti is a vector of dummies indicating year of migration; and
the experience (fx, gxf , gxh) and schooling (fs, gsf , gsh) functions are typically taken to
be quadratic and linear respectively. If the return to experience is nonlinear, the return
to host-country experience must depend on the stock of foreign experience held.6 The
interaction of foreign and host-country experience function (gxhf ) captures this dependence.
We begin by estimating (3.10) without individual fixed effects comparing the estimates
between more and less accurate measures of foreign and host-country schooling and ex-
perience, in order to gauge the importance of measurement error in driving the results
of the existing literature (the alternative variable definitions are described in subsection
6For example, if the experience profile is quadratic, that is β1expi + β2exp22, and foreign and host-
country experience are equivalent, then substituting expi = expfi + exphi the return to post-migration
experience is given by β1 + 2β2exphi + 2β2expfi, where the last term captures the dependence of the
host-country return on the stock of foreign experience held.
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3.4.3 below). Murphy and Welch (1990), and more recently Lemieux (2006), show that
the standard quadratic experience profile substantially understates early career wages and
overstates mid-career wage growth. In all cases we, therefore, estimate quartic functions
in host-country experience (fx), but quadratic functions in foreign experience (gxf ) and
immigrant-specific host-country experience (gxh), and linear functions in schooling (fs, gsf
and gsh) and the interaction of foreign and host-country experience (gxhf ).
We then extend the separate returns model in equation (3.10) in three ways. First,
with information on actual years of work experience we are able to identify idle years,
that is time spent outside of school and work. By not controlling for idle years we are
assuming that this time has either no direct wage effect, through for example skill atrophy,
or that it is uncorrelated with years of schooling and experience. If both assumptions
are unsatisfied, the estimated schooling and experience returns will suffer from omitted
variable bias. Both assumptions, however, seem problematic, particularly for immigrants
who are likely to have higher values of total idle time and are likely to use this in improving
language skills and developing social networks. We, therefore, add host-country and foreign
years of idle time to the model. Second, the assumption that host-country and foreign
schooling are additively separable in producing wage outcomes assumes that there are no
complementarities between foreign and host-country schooling. Again, for immigrants this
assumption seems unreasonable. Friedberg (2000), for example, argues that immigrants
arriving with more schooling may experience more occupational downgrading upon arrival
and greater subsequent earnings growth. Using U.S. Census data, Bratsberg and Ragan
(2002) find evidence that the return to host-country schooling is increasing in the stock of
foreign schooling held. And Ferrer, Green and Riddell (2006) find evidence using Canadian
data that the return to foreign experience is decreasing in the quantity of foreign education
held. The potential to identify these complementarities is a key advantage of the separate
returns model. In order to capture these complementarities, we add interaction terms
between foreign and host-country sources of schooling, experience, and idle years.
The final extension we make is to address the possible endogeneity of the post-migration
schooling/work decision. If we were only concerned about selective outmigration we could
simply condition samples of immigrant cohorts on reaching some level of YSM and examine
wage growth over this period. This is the approach of Edin, Lalonde and Åslund (2000),
Hu (2000) and Lubotsky (2007). Due to the short and unbalanced nature of the panels
in our data, and our interest in identifying post-migration returns to schooling, experience
and idle years, our preferred strategy is to account for individual fixed effects (FE) in
estimating the separate returns model. This approach has the advantage that we capture
the wage growth of all immigrants and not just immigrants who remain in the host country
for some specified duration. To the extent that FE purge the data of correlation between
unobserved individual effects and both emigration and changes in post-migration work and
schooling decisions, our approach produces consistent estimates of immigrant wage growth
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conditional on post-migration behaviour. It continues, however, to produce inconsistent
estimates if emigration or levels of host-country experience, schooling or idle years are
not strictly exogenous (conditional on the FE). This would be the case if, for example,
emigration is more likely among workers who correctly anticipate relatively low future
wage growth or if the incidence of obtaining additional schooling upon arrival is higher
among workers that, even in the absence of additional schooling, would have experienced
above average post-migration wage growth.7
In adding individual fixed effects to equation (3.10) two complications arise. First, since
all the foreign human capital variables are strictly time-invariant, their returns are no longer
identified (though the interactions of foreign and host-country variables are). As a result,
we can no longer predict an immigrant wage level upon arrival and therefore cannot infer
assimilation. Our solution is to identify returns to the time-invariant regressors in a second
stage regression, which is estimated at the individual level (see Polachek and Kim 1994 for
details). The second stage is estimated by either OLS or GLS exploiting information on
the diagonal elements of the residual covariance matrix from the first stage. Second, since
the year-to-year change in host-country schooling, experience and idle years must sum to
1 (∆exphit + ∆shit + ∆idlehit = 1), the year effects, yt, are no longer identified in the fixed
effects estimation. We, therefore, use the annual provincial unemployment rate (and its
interaction with the immigrant dummy) to identify period effects.8
3.4.2 Data
The Survey of Income and Labour Dynamics (SLID) is a nationally representative longi-
tudinal survey of the Canadian population. An oft-cited limitation of the SLID data is
that individuals are followed for only 6 years. The advantage of this short-panel design,
however, is that new overlapping panels are sampled every 3 years, thereby substantially
increasing the number of immigrants sampled. In constructing our sample, we pool the 4
existing panels collected between 1993 and 2004 (the fourth panel contains only 3 years).
When we extract all individuals aged 18-64 with full-time work experience and a valid
wage and covariate set we are left with 5,951 immigrants and 55,491 native-born workers
7Two others sources of endogenous selection of concern – besides selective emigration – are non-random
sample attrition and selection into wage employment. The latter is more of a problem here than in papers
focusing on earnings. In the absence of suitable instruments to identify these selection processes, we are
limited to controlling for unobserved FE.
8We tried using various detrended unemployment rates in the hope of isolating cyclical fluctuations,
but found that since there is a substantial trend in unemployment rates (and our estimated year effects)
over our data period, the resulting experience returns appear to overstate wage growth. Our preference is
therefore to use unadjusted unemployment rates.
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who are, on average, observed for 3.7 and 3.9 years, respectively.9 In order to estimate
returns with meangingful precision, we pool men and women. We have tried estimating all
specifications separately for men and women and none of our main findings substantively
change.
In addition to providing a reasonably large longitudinal sample of immigrants, the SLID
questionnaire is exceptionally rich in content, providing three key pieces of information.
First, the SLID collects information on total years of schooling separately for elementary
and secondary; non-university postsecondary; and university postsecondary, as well as all
credentials received and the age when the final non-university and/or university credential
was obtained. By comparing the age when credentials were obtained to the age at immi-
gration, we are better able to distinguish foreign from host-country sources of schooling
than is possible in the standard data sources available. Of course, data sources with direct
information on the source country of schooling now exist, such as the International Adults
Literacy Survey (IALS) and the Longitudinal Immigrant Database (IMDB), but these are
strictly cross-sectional or do not identify post-migration schooling investments. Second,
the SLID identifies the age when full-time work began and the years of actual labour
market experience subsequently accumulated. Lastly, the survey collects information on
remuneration and hours of work in all jobs over the previous calendar year allowing for
the construction of an hourly wage reflecting a weighted average of all paid work done
in the reference year. The assimilation patterns we identify are therefore less likely to
reflect labour supply adjustments than if earnings data – the usual outcome variable in
this literature – were used.
3.4.3 Variable definitions
In order to obtain evidence on the consequences of measurement error, we begin by consid-
ering three alternative definitions of foreign and host-country schooling, which we combine
with the implied quantities of foreign and host-country potential experience. We then take
our preferred definition of foreign and host-country schooling and combine it with three
alternative definitions of foreign and host-country actual experience. This gives us a total
of six variable sets to estimate equation (3.10).
As noted above, in the absence of direct information on the source of schooling, the stan-
dard approach is to assume strictly continuous schooling. We refer to this approach, which
9We know from Census data that immigrants comprise roughly 20% of the Canadian population. They
are under-represented in the SLID data because they are heavily concentrated in Canada’s urban centres
where the sampling frame undersamples all individuals. Sampling weights are used, however, throughout
the analysis and are pooled and unadjusted just as is typically done when cross-sections of data are pooled.
The sample is, therefore, representative of some weighted average of the Canadian populations between
1993 and 2004.
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tends to overmeasure (undermeasure) foreign (host-country) schooling, as “left-continuous
schooling”. Alternatively, we can assume that elementary and secondary school years are
again strictly continuous from age 5, but all postsecondary schooling years are strictly
continuous up to the age of school completion.10 We refer to this approach, which tends
to over measure (under measure) host-country (foreign) schooling, as “right-continuous
schooling”. Lastly, we define intermediate values between these two extremes by assuming
again that elementary and secondary school years are continuous from age 5, but only the
duration of the final educational stint (which we define using information on years of non-
university and university schooling and credentials obtained) is continuous up to the age
of school completion. All remaining postsecondary school years are instead assumed to be
uniformly distributed in the years between the age when elementary or secondary schooling
was completed (or when full-time work began) and the age when the final educational stint
began. For example, someone with a four-year undergraduate degree who finished high
school at age 18 and began a PhD at age 26 would be assigned 0.5 (4/(26− 18)) years of
schooling in each years between age 18 and 26. We refer to this intermediate definition as
“uniformly-distributed schooling.” Since we believe schooling is not continuous for many
individuals, particularly for immigrants, this is our preferred definition of schooling.
Table 3.1 shows the means of the schooling and potential experience variables. Given
our definitions, it is necessarily true at the level of the individual observations, that
left-continuous foreign schooling is greater than or equal to uniformly-distributed foreign
schooling, which in turn must be at least as large as right-continuous foreign schooling
(opposite weak inequalities for host-country schooling). The difference between the two
extreme definitions is about 0.7 years for schooling and not much more than 0.6 years for
potential experience. The reason is that for the majority of observations the difference
between the school completion age and total years of schooling plus 5 is small – less than 3
years for 52.8% of immigrants and 57.8% of natives. Nonetheless, little can be said about
the relative estimated returns to these variables. If the advantage in host-country sources is
very different in experience than schooling or the measurement error is highly non-random,
these small differences could impact estimated returns in a meaningful way.
Less clear is how to split actual years of experience into its foreign and host-country
components. Our approach begins by defining “potential working years” as the difference
between current age and the age when full-time work began, net of any post-work school
years. If actual years of experience equals potential working years, the problem is simple:
we assume a single year of experience attained in every year spent outside of school after
work began. However, to the extent that actual experience is less than potential working
10Note that roughly 20% of the sample with postsecondary school years does not have a postsecondary
credential. To assure ourselves this is not a peculiarity of the SLID data, we have confirmed this result in
Canadian Census data. For these individuals we assume the age of school completion is the minimum of
current age and 35.
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years, it is ambiguous whether the idle years occurred before or after migration. Our
approach to this problem is similar to that used in defining the schooling variables. At
one extreme we err on the side of overmeasuring (undermeasuring) foreign (host-country)
experience by assuming total actual years of experience are continuous from the age when
full-time work began. We refer to this as “left-continuous actual experience.” At the
other extreme we err on the side of overmeasuring (undermeasuring) host-country (foreign)
experience by assuming that total actual years of experience are continuous up to the
current age. We refer to this as ”right-continuous actual experience.” Lastly, we define
an intermediate case in which total actual years of experience are uniformly distributed
between the current age and the age full-time work began. This definition is referred to
as “uniformly-distributed actual experience”.11 In all cases we use uniformly-distributed
schooling to define foreign and host-country potential working years.
Table 3.1 shows the means of the actual experience variables. As one might expect,
given the challenges that immigrants are likely to experience finding employment in the
host-country, idle years are substantially larger for immigrants than natives (6.9 years
compared to 4.1).12 The differences in foreign and host-country quantities between the
alternative variable definitions are, however, once again small – roughly one full year in
the case of actual experience and slightly less for potential experience. But again, since
little can be said about the relative distribution of measurement error in each variable
definition, we have no priors about the relative estimated returns based on the alternative
definitions.
The SLID data allow us to produce more accurate measures of foreign/host-country
schooling and experience than is possible using the standard data sources available. But
some measurement errors almost certainly remain. For example, treating the SLID data
as cross-sections, individual-level foreign quantities of schooling and experience are not
strictly time-invariant over the panels in our data, which we know they should be (assum-
ing individuals are not working abroad for partial years). In order to make the results
comparable to those in the literature, we begin by defining the variables first ignoring the
longitudinal dimension of the data. However, when we introduce the individual fixed effects
we redefine the variables restricting all changes in schooling, actual experience, and idle
years to increase only the host-country quantities. Since the fixed effects model identifies
the host-country returns exclusively off these within-panel changes, in the case of the fixed
effects estimates all biases arising from errors in distinguishing foreign from host-country
11Since individuals can accumulate school years while working full time, it is possible actual experience
exceeds potential working years. In this case, the difference is assumed to be all foreign, in the left-
continuous case, or all host-country, in the right-continuous case. In the case of uniformly-distributed
actual experience, no additional assumption is necessary, since the number of years of actual experience
accumulated in each calendar year are constant and greater than one.
12Note that mean idle years exceed the difference between mean potential and actual experience by a
small margin. The reason is idle years are restricted to be non-negative.
86
quantities are thereby effectively eliminated.
3.5 Results
Table 3.2 reports the results from using the three alternative definitions of foreign and
host-country schooling and actual labour market experience (first three columns assume
potential experience; last three assume uniformly-distributed schooling). The estimates
assuming left-continuous schooling are similar to those reported elsewhere and, if anything,
tend to be slightly smaller, perhaps reflecting our use of an hourly wage, as opposed to
earnings. The return to host-country schooling for both natives and immigrants exceeds the
return to foreign schooling, though the differences are small (0.064 and 0.055 respectively,
compared to 0.052). The estimated return to foreign experience is very close to zero and
statistically insignificant. Also consistent with estimates found elsewhere, the relative host-
country experience return for immigrants (the gxh function) is negative, but increasing (it
becomes positive at 29 years of host-country experience). This negative return is expected
since immigrants, on average, arrive with some foreign experience so their host-country
return captures a flatter part of their overall experience profile.
What happens to these estimated returns when we use our more accurate measures of
foreign and host-country schooling? The foreign experience return clearly tends to increase
as more schooling is defined as host-country. Comparing the two extreme definitions – left-
and right-continuous schooling – the linear term doubles in magnitude and becomes statis-
tically significant. The quadratic term, however, also becomes larger (in absolute value).
Twenty years of foreign experience, in the case of right-continuous schooling, implies a 0.1
log point wage increment, compared to 0.05 log points in the case of left-continuous or
uniformly-distributed schooling. Measurement error resulting from assuming continuous
schooling, therefore, appears to contribute to the low estimated returns to foreign expe-
rience in the literature, though even under the most extreme assumptions the return is
small. The returns to both foreign and host-country schooling also become larger, though
the differences here are also small. Lastly, the immigrant return to host-country experi-
ence tends to decrease. The results, overall, suggest that the consequences of assuming
strictly continuous schooling in the absence of better data are modest. Why is this true?
Across definitions there is a considerable advantage of host-country over foreign sources of
experience, implying the difference between β1 and β2 in equation (3.9) is substantial. The
differences in means across alternative definitions in Table 3.1, in contrast, appear quite
small, suggesting the robustness of the estimates probably has more to do with a small
amount of measurement error, than the nature of the measurement error problem.
Replacing the potential experience measures with actual experience, shown in the re-
maining columns of Table 3.2, tends to further increase the estimated returns to foreign
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experience, at least up to 10 years or so. In the left-continuous case, the linear return
is now close to 0.02 log points and statistically significant. Nonetheless, in all cases the
foreign returns continue to be small relative to the return to host-country experience for
either immigrants or natives. As for schooling, using actual experience in all cases tends
to decrease the estimated returns and imply an even smaller advantage of host-country
over foreign schooling. In the uniformly-distributed case, for example, the immigrant re-
turn to foreign schooling is 0.046 log points, compared to 0.048 log points for host-country
schooling.
Having estimated the separate returns model, in Figure 3.1 we compare the implications
for assimilation of using the standard and our preferred measures of foreign/host-country
schooling and experience (uniformly-distributed schooling and actual experience). In both
cases we predict entry log wages for a recent immigrant (arrival cohort 1990-2002) arriving
with the sample mean years of foreign schooling (9.77) and work experience (5.98). We
then compare subsequent predicted wage growth to a similarly aged native-born worker
assuming both accumulate one year of host-country labour market experience in every
subsequent year. Assuming schooling begins at age 5 and no idle years, both representative
workers are initially 5+9.77+5.98 = 20.75 years of age. To simplify the results, the vertical
axis plots the difference between the predicted immigrant and native log wage. The results
indicate identical entry effects in the two cases. The only apparent different between the two
profiles is subsequent wage growth is slightly higher in the first 10 years following migration
using our preferred variable definitions, but then flattens out more quickly. Specifically,
using the preferred definitions, the initial gap of 0.29 log points is more than halved after
only 8 years, but remains virtually unchanged at 0.09 log points between year 13 and 25.
In comparison, using the standard definitions, the initial gap of 0.29 log points is halved
within ten years and in the following 10 and 20 years it closes by an additional 0.05 and
0.02 log points, respectively. When one thinks about language acquisition or acculturation
processes, this pattern of strong decreasing relative returns to host-experience using our
preferred definitions would appear to better capture reality. In this respect, the relative
wage profile of the separate returns model seems more reasonable, though the differences
are small.13
13A less compelling feature of the preferred definitions is the strong convexity of the profile beginning
at about age 46 (though less apparent, this is also a feature of the profile using the standard definitions).
What explains it? It turns out both the immigrant and native host-country experience profiles eventually
reach a point of sharply decreasing returns, but natives reach the point of decreasing returns earlier than
immigrants, resulting in the convexity. When actual years of experience is used, the point of decreasing
returns occurs earlier, so the convexity kicks in earlier. Because actual experience levels tend to be lower
and our starting point is a native who already has 6 years experience, less than 5% of both the native and
immigrant observations have host-country experience beyond the point when the convexity kicks in. By
the end of the 35-year period we are essentially making out-of-sample predictions. One would, therefore,
not want to give the convexity any economic interpretation.
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In Table 3.3 we extend the separate returns model allowing all the host-country returns
to depend on the foreign human capital stock and controlling for idle years. To allow for
the possibility that the relative returns to foreign and host-country sources of schooling
and experience may vary widely across immigrants from different parts of the world, we
also fully interact the immigrant-specific component of equation (3.10) with a dummy
variable distinguishing immigrants from Canada’s traditional immigrant source countries
– the U.S., U.K., and Northern, Western and Southern Europe – from those from non-
traditional source regions – Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. The results from the pooled
sample suggest a very small positive return to idle years for immigrants (and natives),
whether it is foreign or host-country. This is, however, no longer true when we distinguish
between immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries. In particular,
the return to host-country idle years is significant and close to 0.02 (0.002+0.017) log
points for immigrants coming from countries where language and cultural differences are
likely greatest. The interactions of host-country idle years with foreign experience and
foreign schooling are, however, also more negative. Therefore, for adult immigrants from
non-traditional source countries, but not child immigrants, the return to host-country idle
years appears to be, if anything, negative.
With few exceptions, the interaction terms in Table 3.3 suggest modest complemen-
tarities between foreign and host-country sources of human capital. In the pooled sample,
arriving with additional foreign experience has almost exactly a nil effect on the host-
country experience profile. Additional foreign schooling appears to reduce the return to
host-country experience, though the effect is again small (but statistically significant). For
example, arriving with 16 years of foreign schooling (relative to none) reduces the linear re-
turn to host-country experience by only 0.006 log points. We also find little evidence here,
for either traditional or non-traditional source country immigrants, that foreign schooling
returns are higher for immigrants with more host-country schooling – the interaction of
foreign and host-country schooling term is 0.0002 compared to 0.001 in Friedberg (2000,
Table 6) using Israeli data. This difference is not explained by our richer information on
the source of schooling – we get exactly the same result using the standard variable def-
initions. One wonders if the difference reflects credential recognition issues, which have
over the past decade been the focus of much discussion surrounding Canada’s immigrant
settlement policies. To the extent that foreign-trained professionals opt to train for entirely
new careers following migration in the absence of a system for recognizing foreign training,
and the skills involved are not complementary, we would expect this interaction term to
be zero.
In Figure 3.2 we plot predicted log wages separately for natives and immigrants based
on the estimates in Table 3.3. Adding idle years and interaction terms does essentially
nothing to change the level or slope of the native wage profile. Distinguishing immigrants
from traditional and non-traditional source countries suggests a substantially lower entry
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wage for non-traditional immigrants – 0.115 log points – primarily reflecting an overall
differential (a cohort effect) as opposed to lower returns to foreign schooling or experience.
Subsequent wage growth, however, is virtually identical over the following 35-year period
for the two immigrant types. Though the sharp change in the slope of the profiles around
the tenth year gives the illusion that the traditional-immigrant profile is steeper, the rate
of assimilation is at all ages slightly higher for non-traditional immigrants.14
In Table 3.4 we present the FE results. Since we are ultimately interested in the sen-
sitivity of the results to the inclusion of individual fixed effects, we also report estimates
from pooled OLS. To capture the main differences, we then predict log wage profiles using
exactly the same approach as in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, assuming a constant unemployment
rate of 7.5% (the mean level in the data). Figure 3.3 indicates that estimation by FE
does little to change the results. In terms of the age-experience simulation (for the sake of
brevity we only show the GLS case), the entry effect from FE is 0.229 log points compared
to 0.221 from pooled OLS. This is perhaps not surprising, given that entry wages are iden-
tified exclusively off time-invariant foreign stocks of human capital, and therefore include
all unobserved individual heterogeneity (as argued above, in informing selection policy we
do not want to purge entry wages of unobserved heterogeneity). Subsequent relative immi-
grant wage growth, however, also changes little. Over the full 35-year period, native wages
now grow slightly more (0.343 log points compared to 0.327), while immigrant wages grow
slightly less (0.631 log points compared to 0.677). As a result, the “average” immigrant
considered now reaches wage parity with the comparable native roughly ten years later
(age 46, instead of 36).
What explains the fact that our FE estimates do not imply substantially lower im-
migrant wage growth as the U.S. literature has tended to find (e.g., Lubotsky 2007)? It
turns out, it is not because we are identifying wage growth off a return to host-country
experience, whereas other studies identify off YSM – we get a similar differences between
pooled OLS and FE when we estimate the using either the base or extended YSM model
described in Section 3.2. We can think of two other reasons, however, that may explain the
difference. First, it may be that this result is unique to Canada. Indeed, there is reason to
believe that the nature of emigration is different in Canada. In particular, immigration to
Canada may serve as a stepping stone for onward migration to the U.S.. This onward mi-
gration may be most common among highly able, highly motivated workers, so that in the
Canadian data, YSM is less positively correlated with high unobserved individual effects.
Alternatively, even if the nature of selective emigration is similar in Canada and the U.S.,
if the propensity to emigrate in both countries is increasing in individuals’ post-migration
14It turns out this result is somewhat sensitive to variable definitions. Using standard variable definitions
– left-continuous schooling and potential experience – suggests both a lower entry effect for traditional
source country immigrants and a higher subsequent assimilation rate. For the sake of brevity we do not
show these results. They are, however, available upon request.
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wage growth, then excluding emigrants from the sample, as the existing U.S. studies do will
imply lower wage growth. But controlling for individual fixed effects will not. Lower wage
growth from longitudinal estimates does not then reflect selective emigration of workers
with low wage levels, as has been interpreted in these studies.
We have argued that an important advantage of the separate returns model is that it
offers a richer set of counterfactual predictions to inform immigrant selection and settlement
policy. In Figures 3.4 and 3.5 we perform two such simulations. In Figure 3.4 we compare
predicted log wage profiles for immigrants arriving with 16 years of foreign schooling,
but different quantities of foreign experience, and compare to a native with the same total
schooling and experience. In Figure 3.5 we compare host-country wage growth across three
immigrants, each arriving with 5 years of foreign experience, but with varying quantities
of foreign schooling. In the first case, the immigrant arrives at age 30 with 20 years of
schooling and accumulates one year of host-country experience in each subsequent year.
In the second case, the immigrant arrives at age 26 with 16 years of schooling, but then
completes an additional 4 years of schooling, before beginning to accumulate host-country
experience. In the last case, the immigrant arrives with 16 years of foreign schooling, but
accumulates 4 idle years before beginning to accumulate host-country experience.15 These
profiles are, again, compared to a similarly-aged native, who initially (age 26) has 16 years
of schooling and 5 years experience.
A return to potential foreign work experience close to zero is a standard result in
the literature. Though using actual experience increases the return slightly (Table 3.2),
controlling for individual FE does not (Table 3.4). At least over the first 8 years, the
FE foreign experience returns are, if anything, slightly smaller (though still significant).
This is captured in Figure 3.4 in the very modest improvements in entry wage rates across
immigrants arriving with very different amounts of work experience. What is arguably
more interesting in Figure 3.4, however, is that not only does additional foreign experience
do essentially nothing to improve entry wages, it also appears to reduce subsequent wage
growth. For example, over the first 5 years wages grow by 0.264 log points for the immigrant
with 5 years foreign experience, compared to 0.254 log points for the immigrant with 15
years of foreign experience. This difference, which is statistically significant, is driven by
the negative foreign/host-country experience interaction term. In fact, with enough YSM,
the host-country experience return is lower for the immigrant arriving with 15, compared
to 5, years of foreign experience, even conditioning on age. As a result, after age 51 the
dashed and dotted profiles are diverging.
Recent years have seen a shift in Canadian immigrant selection criteria towards greater
emphasis on host-country educational credentials. The evidence in Figure 3.5 does not
15In all cases we assume that the immigrant has some foreign experience to reflect the reality of the
Canadian skilled immigrant selection criteria, which essentially disqualifies applicants with no foreign work
experience.
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suggest that this emphasis is well founded. In particular, providing immigrants with four
additional years of schooling (20 instead of 16 years) has almost exactly the same effect on
wage levels and wage growth whether the additional four years were obtained in Canada
or abroad. It is, of course, possible that the advantage of host-country credentials lies
primarily in improving employment prospects, though as long as reservation wages are
decreasing in unemployment durations, we would expect this to show up in wage outcomes.
3.6 Summary
We argue that directly estimating foreign and host-country human capital returns is advan-
tageous in terms of both avoiding biases inherent in the more standard YSM approach and
in terms of its policy relevance. The problem with estimating separate returns, however,
is twofold. First, unlike YSM models, it requires that the source country of immigrants’
schooling and experience be identified in the data, which it is typically not. Second, in
distinguishing post-migration schooling and work decisions, the separate returns model
introduces an additional source of endogeneity, which complicates inferences made regard-
ing immigrant wage growth and assimilation. We posit that these challenges explain the
predominance of the YSM approach in the assimilation literature. The question we ask is
how substantial are these potential biases in the Canadian data, where estimation of the
separate returns model has become increasingly common in recent years.
Using a particularly rich longitudinal dataset on roughly 6,000 immigrants, we find that
that the biases inherent in estimating foreign and host-country returns directly using stan-
dard data sources appear modest. In particularly, using more accurate measures of foreign
and host-country sources of schooling and experience and controlling for individual fixed
effects does little to alter the main findings of the existing Canadian literature. In partic-
ular, we continue to find low returns to immigrant foreign experience and little advantage
of host-country over foreign schooling returns for immigrants. In addition, we find addi-
tional foreign work experience not only does essentially nothing to raise immigrant wage
outcomes at entry, but also lowers subsequent returns to host-country work experience.
The return to foreign schooling for immigrants from both traditional and non-traditional
source countries is, in contrast, virtually identical to their return to host-country schooling,
raising questions about recent efforts to attach greater weight to host-country educational
credentials in Canadian immigrant selection policy.
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 Immigrants Natives 
 Foreign Host-country   
Log hourly wage  2.781 (0.500)  2.757 (0.501) 
       
Years of schooling:       
Left continuous 9.774 (6.208) 4.192 (6.168) 13.874 (3.310) 
Uniform 9.338 (5.855) 4.628 (6.006) 13.874 (3.310) 
Right continuous 9.115 (5.681) 4.851 (6.006) 13.874 (3.310) 
       
Potential experience:       
Left continuous 5.976 (7.619) 17.251 (10.677) 19.083 (11.880) 
Uniform 6.398 (7.631) 16.830 (10.686) 19.083 (11.880) 
Right continuous 6.597 (7.702) 16.642 (10.767) 19.083 (11.880) 
       
Actual experience:       
Left continuous 2.927 (5.545) 13.381 (10.176) 14.972 (10.845) 
Uniform 2.302 (5.180) 14.006 (10.299) 14.972 (10.845) 
Right continuous 2.008 (4.869) 14.300 (10.302) 14.972 (10.845) 
       
Idle years:       
Left continuous 3.856 (6.119) 3.544 (5.319) 4.464 (6.270) 
Uniform 4.174 (6.164) 3.256 (5.213) 4.464 (6.270) 
Right continuous 4.414 (6.236) 3.072 (5.190) 4.464 (6.270) 
       
Cohort  <1960  0.112 (0.316)  — 
Cohort 1960-1969  0.169 (0.374)  — 
Cohort 1970-1979  0.254 (0.435)  — 
Cohort 1980-1989  0.251 (0.433)  — 
Cohort 1990-2002  0.214 (0.410)  — 
       
Female  0.476 (0.499)  0.470 (0.499) 
       
Rural  0.028 (0.165)  0.130 (0.336) 
Small  0.084 (0.277)  0.249 (0.432) 
Medium  0.133 (0.340)  0.189 (0.392) 
Large  0.755 (0.430)  0.432 (0.495) 
Ontario  0.560 (0.496)  0.327 (0.469) 
Atlantic  0.014 (0.116)  0.097 (0.297) 
Quebec  0.115 (0.319)  0.277 (0.448) 
Prairies  0.040 (0.196)  0.076 (0.266) 
Alberta  0.099 (0.299)  0.106 (0.308) 
British Columbia  0.173 (0.378)  0.116 (0.320) 
       
Number of 
observations 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The three chapters of my dissertation examine immigrant assimilation in the Canadian
labour market, in the hope of providing valuable insights to inform immigrant selection
and settlement policy. I employ different sample restrictions in the three chapters, which
produce three scopes of analysis. The first chapter provides the broadest level of analysis by
investigating the labour market dynamics of the entire immigrant population relative to the
native-born workers. I exploit recently-introduced immigrant identifiers in the Canadian
Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the longitudinal dimension of these data to compare the
labor force and job dynamics of Canada’s native-born and immigrant populations. I am
particularly interested in the role of job, as opposed to worker, heterogeneity in driving
immigrant wage disparities and in how the paths into and out of jobs of varying quality
compares between immigrants and the native-born.
The second level of analysis narrows the sample to employed Canadian-born and im-
migrant workers, thereby excluding unemployed individuals and those out of labour force.
This chapter is instead primarily concerned with the choice between working in the self- or
the paid-employment sector. With the newly available data from the 2006 Canadian Cen-
sus, I extend the previous studies by examining changes in the likelihood of self-employment
across arrival cohorts of immigrants and how self-employment rates evolve in the years fol-
lowing migration to Canada, and by estimating the potential earnings difference between
the self- and the paid employment sectors. As a result, I am able to explore the implica-
tions of the difference in the patterns of a comparative earnings advantage on the choice
of self-employment among traditional and non-traditional immigrant populations.
The third chapter is the narrowest in scope, as it restricts the sample to paid employees.
At this narrow level, the focus is on assimilation in earnings conditional on employment in
the paid-employment sector. It attempts to estimate separate wage returns to foreign and
host-country sources of human capital. Using a particularly rich longitudinal Canadian
data source, I examine the extent to which the previous findings of Canadian immigrant
wage assimilation may be driven by biases arising from errors in measuring foreign and
host-country sources of human capital and the endogeneity of post-migration schooling and
work experience.
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To analyze the labor force and job dynamics of Canada’s native-born and immigrant
populations, I identify five states in the labour market including both the paid- and the
self-employment sector. Therefore, the important transition probabilities among high-wage
jobs, low-wage jobs and self-employment cast insights on immigrant choice between the self-
and the paid-employment sectors. Specifically, the main findings are that the disparity in
immigrant job quality, which does not appear to diminish with years since arrival, reflects
a combination of relatively low transitions into high-wage jobs and high transitions out of
these jobs. The former result appears about equally due to difficulties obtaining high-wage
jobs directly out of unemployment and in using low-wage jobs as stepping-stones. I find
little or no evidence, however, that immigrant jobseekers face barriers to low-wage jobs.
In turn, these findings provide some evidence that immigrants have difficulties accessing
paid-employment sector so that they are forced to enter the self-employment sector, which
can explain why immigrants turn to self-employment at a faster rate than earlier cohorts,
in particular of new immigrants who arrived between 1996 and 2005, in the absence of an
earnings advantage in this sector.
In the analysis of the labor force and job dynamics, I focus on immigrant earnings out-
comes relative to the native-born within sector. However, the second chapter explores im-
migrant potential earnings difference relative to the native-born across, instead of within,
sectors. My findings show that the earnings advantage between the self- and the paid-
employment sectors accounts for the tendency of increasing self-employment rates with
more years following migration, observed in the traditional immigrant population. How-
ever, the reduction of a potential earnings advantage in the self-employment sector, relative
to the paid-employment sector, provides no evidence that non-traditional immigrants be-
come increasingly likely to be self-employed upon entry and over time. Besides the possible
explanation of barriers accessing paid-employment, immigrants may either be attracted to
the self-employment sector by non-monetary benefits, or by the higher propensity for self-
employment exhibited in the source country.
In the first two chapters, I employ a standard assimilation-type approach, which infers
the assimilation process by estimating the return to an immigrant’s years since migration
(YSM). Evidence on the relative wage returns to host-country schooling and experience, on
the other hand, provide the implications on immigrant selectivity and settlement policies.
We find that the biases inherent in estimating foreign and host-country returns directly
using standard data sources appear modest. In particular, using more accurate measures
of foreign and host-country sources of schooling and experience and controlling for individ-
ual fixed effects does little to alter the main findings of the existing Canadian literature.
Therefore, this suggests that the estimates in the first two chapters do not appear to be
driven by biases arising from either the assumptions necessary to distinguish foreign from
host-country human capital or from unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, we find additional
foreign work experience not only does essentially nothing to raise immigrant wage out-
103
comes at entry, but also lowers subsequent returns to host-country work experience. The
return to foreign schooling for immigrants from both traditional and non-traditional source
countries is, in contrast, virtually identical to their return to host-country schooling.
104
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 Men Women 
Age  0.0294*** (0.0015) 0.0249*** (0.0014) 
Age squared -0.0277*** (0.0018) -0.0244*** (0.0017) 
     
Elementary school     
High school incomplete 0.0210 (0.0117) 0.0334* (0.0160) 
High school graduate 0.0706*** (0.0114) 0.0288 (0.0191) 
Some post-secondary 0.0656*** (0.0122) 0.1261*** (0.0160) 
Trade or college credential 0.1085*** (0.0113) 0.1529*** (0.0154) 
University below Bachelor’s 0.1313*** (0.0149) 0.2054*** (0.0171) 
Bachelor’s degree 0.1579*** (0.0122) 0.2470*** (0.0159) 
Graduate degree 0.2046*** (0.0140) 0.3231*** (0.0168) 
     
Married 0.0563*** (0.0032) 0.0292*** (0.0030) 
     
Time trend 0.0014** (0.0005) 0.0014** (0.0005) 
Time trend squared -0.0006 (0.0013) -0.0001 (0.0012) 
     
Newfoundland      
Prince Edward Island -0.0634*** (0.0090) 0.0346*** (0.0075) 
Nova Scotia 0.0078 (0.0078) 0.0313*** (0.0065) 
New Brunswick -0.0142 (0.0076) 0.0175** (0.0066) 
Quebec 0.0919*** (0.0069) 0.1180*** (0.0059) 
Ontario 0.1834*** (0.0068) 0.1890*** (0.0058) 
Saskatchewan 0.0765*** (0.0076) 0.0979*** (0.0065) 
Manitoba 0.1137*** (0.0076) 0.1063*** (0.0063) 
Alberta 0.2341*** (0.0076) 0.1891*** (0.0065) 
British Columbia 0.2142*** (0.0074) 0.2127*** (0.0065) 
     
CMA urban      
CA urban -0.0170*** (0.0037) -0.0273*** (0.0034) 
Non-CA urban -0.0254*** (0.0045) -0.0416*** (0.0042) 
Urban fringe 0.0131 (0.0081) -0.0019 (0.0081) 
Rural -0.0015 (0.0036) -0.0244*** (0.0033) 
     
Union  0.0923*** (0.0027)  
Part-time  -0.0484*** (0.0037)  
Hourly-paid  -0.1218*** (0.0027)  
Paid commission/tips  0.0791*** (0.0055)  
Temporary contract  -0.0766*** (0.0039)  
      
Establishment less than 20     
Firm less than 20     
Firm 20 to 99  0.0355*** (0.0069)  
Firm 100 to 500  0.0662*** (0.0065)  
Firm more than 500  0.0743*** (0.0046)  
Establishment 20 to 99     
Firm 20 to 99  0.0803*** (0.0038)  
Firm 100 to 500  0.1093*** (0.0054)  
Firm more than 500  0.1224*** (0.0040)  
Establishment 100 to 500     
Firm 100 to 500  0.1397*** (0.0046)  
Firm more than 500  0.1656*** (0.0041)  
Establishment more than 500     
Firm more than 500  0.1958*** (0.0045)  
     
Female  -0.0403 (0.0455)  
Constant  1.9758*** (0.0326)  
     




Number of observations  179,597  
 Notes: Sample restricted to native-born workers in the first month of their sample rotation. Regression 
also includes 1,447 job-skill/industry fixed effects. The R-squared statistic in the equivalent regression 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Appendix for Chapter 3
Proof of bias in basic YSM model: As long as 0 < m̄ < 1, we know that α2 < β̂1 < α1.
Given β̂0 and β̂1, the estimates of β2 and β3 can then be thought of as coming from the
restricted least squares regression:
wi = β̂0 + β̂1(exphi + expfi) +mi · (β2 + β3exphi) + ei. (B.1)
which amounts to estimating the term in parentheses in (3.2) using only the sample of
immigrants and the adjusted dependent variable:
w̃i = (α0 − β̂0) + (α1 − β̂1)exphi + (α2 − β̂1)expfi + εi. (B.2)
The standard omitted variable bias result then implies the probability limit given in equa-
tion (3.3).
Proof of bias in extended YSM model: If (α1 − α3) = (α2 − α4) ≡ θ, then least squares
produces β̂1 = α1; β̂2 = α2; β̂4 = β̂5 = −θ; and β̂6 = θ, and the estimates correctly predict
no assimilation (since β̂4 + β̂6 = 0 and β̂5 + β̂6 = 0). In general, however, (α1 − α3) 6=
(α2−α4). In this case, β̂6 is estimated as a weighted average of the two differences. Defining
θ1 ≡ (α1−α3) and θ2 ≡ (α2−α4), the problem amounts to estimating a single linear return
θ when the DGP is given by:
yi = θ0 + θ1expi + θ2si + µi. (B.3)
We then know:
plim θ̂ =
θ1var(expi) + θ2var(si) + (θ1 + θ2)cov(expi, si)
var(expi) + var(si) + 2cov(expi, si)
(B.4)
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which is bounded by θ1 and θ2. This tells us that the return to YSM in the unrestricted
model is a weighted average of the advantage in host-country sources of schooling and
experience (over foreign sources), where the weighting depends on the relative magnitudes
of var(exphi +expfi) and var(shi +sfi), as well as the covariances of exphi, shi, expfi, and
sfi. It does not depend on the levels (means) of these variables; this is captured by β3 in
(3.6).
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